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Introduction
Consider the following appropriations of intellectual property thatmight
be committed by public employees: (1) During the course of her development
of a new technique for cheaply producing large amounts of the anti-cancer
drug taxol, a professor at a public university makes unauthorized uses of a
patented cloning process; (2) In the course of training new accountants in a
state tax office, a supervisor makes and distributes photocopies of a substan-
tial portion of a popular accounting text; (3) In order to calm parents who are
worried about the quality of the food in a public elementary school cafeteria,
the principal misleads them into believing that the food is made by a popular
local catering service; (4) In the course of her regulatory duties, an employee
of a state environmental agency releases confidential business information to
the public without the owner's consent; (5) In order to commemorate famous
residents of its state, the head of the state's tourism office strikes and sells
medals of several popular entertainers. Given the likely inadequacy of a suit
for infringement against an individual who has committed a wrongful act,
owners of patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and publicity rights
have begun to bring suits against the governments that benefit from misappro-
priations by their officials.
The answer to the simple but important question of whether a state or
local government can be held liable for the unauthorized appropriation of
private intellectual property turns out to be frustratingly complex. The result
of a lawsuit brought by an aggrieved rights-holder will turn on numerous
variables: Is the named defendant in the suit the state government, a state
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employee acting in his official capacity, a municipality, a municipal employee
acting in his official capacity, or an individual? Is the requested relief mone-
tary or injunctive? Is the intellectual property at issue a patent, copyright,
trademark, trade secret, publicity right, or the right to be free from false
advertising? Is the suit brought in state or federal court? Is the cause of
action based on state law or federal law? Is the appropriation an exercise of
a state's right of eminent domain or an inverse condemnation of property
under the Takings Clause?
The recent enactment of federal legislation purporting to abrogate state
immunity from suit in cases involving patents,' copyrights,2 trademarks,3 and
false advertising4 promised briefly to simplify the question of state liability.
The Supreme Court's subsequent landmark decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,5 however, has reinvigorated state claims to sovereign
immunity and thereby increased uncertainty over the potential liability of a
state or a state actor for the unauthorized use of intellectual property. Given
the increasingly important role played by intellectual property in the economy,
particularly in the areas of computer software and biotechnology, and given
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994).
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person,
including any governmental or non-governmental entity, for infringement of a
patent... or for any other violation under this title.
Id.
2. See 17U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994).
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal [c]ourt by any person...
for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner provided by...
this title.
Id.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994).
Any State, any instrumentality of a State or any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person...
for any violation under this chapter.
Id.
4. See id.
5. See 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (concluding that Congress cannot abrogate states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I powers).
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the pervasive use of intellectual property by state agencies and universities,6
the need for clarity is particularly acute. State and municipal governments
desperately need guidance on the precise parameters of their potential liabil-
ity, especially because courts and commentators have begun to conclude, too
hastily in our view, that Seminole Tribe nullifies the abrogating statutes.7
6. In 1995, state and municipal governments spent over $890 million on business soft-
ware. See Jacqueline D. Ewenstein, Note, Seminole Tribe: Are States Free to Pirate Copyrights
with Impunity?, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 91, 92-93 (1997) (citing amicus brief in Chavez
v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1996), vacatedsub nom. University of Houston v.
Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996) (mem.)).
In addition, numerous recent cases involve patent and copyright suits brought against
states and state universities. See generally College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 148,F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that patent claims against state
agency are not barred by Eleventh Amendment),petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 1998) (No. 98-531); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623
(5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1998) (concluding that copyright and false advertising claims brought against
state university press are barred by Eleventh Amendment); Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding that patent suit against state university is not barred
by Eleventh Amendment); Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that patent suit against state agency is barred by Eleventh Amend-
ment); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that patent suit against
state is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Lane v. FirstNat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989)
(concluding that copyright suit against state is barred by Eleventh Amendment); BV Eng'g v.
UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that copyright suit against state is barred by
Eleventh Amendment); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that copyright suit against state university is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Better
Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 904 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (holding that federal
unfair competition suit against state agency is not barred by Eleventh Amendment), affd sub
nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 689 (1998); Unix Sys.
Lab., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.J. 1993) (concluding that
copyright and trademark causes of action against state university are not barred by Eleventh
Amendment, but trade secret claim is barred).
Professor Kwall has surveyed uses of intellectual property by federal agencies. See
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Pre-
rogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1989) [hereinafter Kwall, The Sovereigns Prerogative]
(describing uses of copyrighted property by large numbers of government agencies).
7. See Chavezv. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623, at* 1 (5th Cir. Oct.
1, 1998) (concluding that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity in copyright
suit); John T. Cross, Intellectual Property and the Eleventh Amendment After Seminole Tribe,
47 DEPAuLL. REv. 519,562 (1998) (concluding that Seminole Tribe nullifies statutes abrogat-
ing Eleventh Amendment in federal intellectual property cases). Compare Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 77 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority's decision poses grave threat to
enforcement of copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws against states), Gen-Probe, Inc. v.
Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948,954 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (asserting thatSeminole Tribe "would
probably compel the conclusion that the patent code cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity"), andAndrew S. Williamson, Note, Policing the States After Seminole,
85 GEO. L.J. 1739, 1751 (1997) (asserting that Congress cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity in patent and copyright cases), with College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
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In order to construct a liability roadmap for the states, specialists in the
substantive law of intellectual property and experts in the field of federal
jurisdiction must combine forces. Although the contours of intellectual
property protection are continually shifting and the law of federal jurisdiction
is notoriously slippery, a convincing picture of much of the law governing the
misappropriation of intellectual property by governments and governmental
actors can be outlined, and unresolved issues can be identified with some
precision.
Part I of this Article addresses relief available to intellectual property
owners under the Takings Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment. Before Congress's
express abrogation of state sovereign immunity in 1992, federal, state, and
local governments were nonetheless potentially liable for misappropriations
of intellectual property that constituted takings without just compensation.8
This examination of the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is
also key to answering the critical question of whether federal patent, copy-
right, and trademark laws establish rights in "property" for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for only under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment may Congress abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Intellectual property owners, not surprisingly, were dissatisfied with the
rather limited restitutionary nature of the states' Fifth Amendment liability.
In 1992, these owners convinced Congress to make the broader remedies
found in federal intellectual property laws applicable against the states. Part
II addresses whether the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe - that Congress
cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity9 pursuant to any of
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that
Seminole Tribe does not eliminate Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity in patent cases),petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1998) (No.
98-531), and Ewenstein, supra note 6.
8. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (stating that patentee "may also assert a 'takings' claim against the state under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments"); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that if copyright owner "exhausts State remedies and establishes that the Massachusetts
legal system affords her no just compensation for the wrongful confiscation of her property, the
Takings Clause of the federal Constitution might at that point enable her to pursue a damage
remedy in federal court"); cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984)
(holding that trade secrets are protected by Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment in suit against
federal government); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1882) (stating that when
government grants patent, it confers on patentee exclusive property that cannot be used or
appropriated by government itself without just compensation).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id. This clause has been interpreted to bar federal
court suits brought by individuals, foreign governments, orlndiantribes, regardless oftheir state
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its Article I powers - renders the 1992 abrogating legislation unconstitutional.
The question is of vital interest to owners of federal intellectual property
because unlike the remedy for a takings claim, a valid claim for patent,
copyright, trademark infringement, or false advertising carries with it the
presumption of injunctive relief and the possibility of monetary damages
beyond mere restitution."0
Moreover, litigating under these statutes affords the plaintiff the subtle
but potentially decisive advantage of access to a federal forum for his federal
claims." After analyzing the Court's recent clarifying opinion in City of
Boerne v. Flores,2 we conclude that Congress properly exercised its power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render states liable in federal
court for patent, copyright, and trademark infringement, but probably not for
false advertising claims. Even if the Court disagrees and strikes down the
abrogating statutes, we conclude that principles of sovereign immunity
probably would not prevent the successful pursuit of a remedy for the viola-
tion of a federal statute in state court.
In Part III, we discuss how the liability landscape differs when the
defendant is a state official or a local government being sued for a statutory
or constitutional violation under the federal intellectual property statutes or
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When a local government has taken property pursu-
ant to an "official policy," the plaintiff may be obliged to pursue an inverse
condemnation suit in state court in lieu of, or at least before, bringing a federal
suit under § 1983. When an officer acts outside the "official policy" of a local
government, a federal § 1983 suit is appropriate, and both damages and
prospective relief will often be available.
Because suits over government intrusions on intellectual property rights
may be brought under federal statutory and constitutional law and state
condemnation law, and in both federal and state courts, the need arises to
coordinate the work of the two judicial systems. Part IV identifies and
addresses these jurisdictional issues.
of residence against any state or "arm" of the state. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115-16 (1994) (providing remedies for trademark infringement and
false advertising); 17 U.S.C. § § 502-04 (1994) (providing remedies for copyright infringement);
35 U.S.C. § 283-84 (1994) (providing remedies for patent infringement).
11. See Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977)
(suggesting "mistaken assumption of parity" among federal and state courts in area of enforce-
ment of federal constitutional rights); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline
of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REv. 609, 610-11
(1991) (stating that "most participants in the parity debate" believe that there is only weak parity
between state and federal courts).
12. See 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997) (concluding thatReligious Freedom Restoration Act
is beyond Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment).
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I Intellectual Property and the Takings Clause
Congress did not attempt to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 3 immunity
in patent, copyright, and trademark cases until 1992. This is not to say,
however, that states and their "arms" had historically been able to misappro-
priate intellectual property with impunity. The Fifth Amendment provides
that the federal government may not take private property for public use
without offering just compensation for the deprivation.14 This clause has long
been interpreted as forbidding uncompensated takings of property by states
and municipalities as well. 5 Under the Eleventh Amendment, claims of
compensation against a state must be brought in state court. 6 The Eleventh
Amendment does not, however, divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to
hear the appeals of disappointed state court takings clause litigants. 7 There-
fore, to the extent that intellectual property constitutes "private property" for
the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, states have always been potentially
liable for some misappropriations.
The Court has defined "property" very broadly in the Fifth Amendment
context. Property is not limited to the
vulgar and untechnical sense ofthe physical thing with respect to which the
citizen exercises rights recognized by law. [Instead it] ... denote[s] the
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[INor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
15. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(concluding that private property taken by state without just compensation to owner is "want-
ing in the due process of law required by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States"). This was the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be applied to the states. See
ERWIN CHEMERNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.4.1, at 504 & n.1
(1997).
16. See John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th
Cir. 1994) (dismissing inverse condemnation claim against State of Texas on Eleventh Amend-
ment grounds); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1710 n.122 (1997) ("The Eleventh Amendment does, however, bar individuals from
maintaining takings claims against states in the lower federal courts."). If a state does not
provide adequate procedures for seeking just compensation, suit may bebrought in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (stating thatproperty owner cannot claim violation ofJust Compensa-
tion Clause ofFifth Amendment ifstate provides adequate procedure for seekingjust compensa-
tion).
17. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Bev. & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26
(1990) (rejecting idea that Eleventh Amendment precludes Supreme Court's exercise of appel-
late jurisdiction in state court suit against state for monetary relief).
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group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it .... The constitutional provision is
addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess. 8
In concluding that copyrights constitute protectable interests, or property,
Professors Dreyfuss and Kwall identify specifically the right to exclude, the
right to manage, and the right to derive an economic benefit as legal interests
marking something as property.' 9 Economists tend to focus on the right to
exclude others from unauthorized use as the key component in defining a
property right.2" The right to exclude others is, of course, the hallmark of both
federal and state intellectual property systems.
Two Supreme Court decisions suggest strongly that intellectual property
shares the constitutional protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment's
command that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation."'" In 1882, the Court in James v. Campbell' declared that
patents were protected by the Takings Clause.' A century later, in Ruckels-
haus v. Monsanto Co.,24 the Court extended the Fifth Amendment guarantee
to trade secrets protected under state law.' Ruckelshaus is particularly
important to the determination of which types of intellectual property are
protected. Iftrade secrets, one ofthe weakest forms of intellectual property,26
are protected by the Fifth Amendment, then patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks must logically be protected as well.
In the intellectual property context, two questions require careful atten-
tion. Liability is based on a "taking" of "property." Which common law or
statutory rights qualify as "property," thus triggering the protection of the
Takings Clause? What kinds of governmental interference amount to a
"taking" of that property?
18. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
19. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 2-3 (1996) (discussing legal concept
of ownership of copyrights).
20. See RICHARDA.POSNERECONOMICANALYSiSOFLAW § 3.1, at36-38 (5th ed. 1998)
(asserting that exclusivity of property is necessary because it creates value and efficient use of
resources).
21. U.S.CONST. amend. V. TheFifthAmendment is directed to the national government.
It was first applied to the states in 1897. See supra note 15.
22. 104 U.S. 356 (1882).
23. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1882).
24. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
25. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
26. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing Court's finding in Ruckels-
haus that government's revealing of trade secret is taking under Fifth Amendment).
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A. Is Intellectual Property Fifth Amendment Property?
By limiting the Fifth Amendment guarantee to "property," the framers
obliged the Supreme Court to come up with criteria for identifying those
interests that qualify as property and for excluding others that would fail the
test. The scarce case law on the subject indicates that the Fifth Amendment
applies in a fairly broad manner to legal rights in intellectual property.27 In
1882, the Court in James v. Campbell considered a claim that a United States
postmaster had infringed the patent for a letter stamping device.28 The Court
held:
That the Government of the United States when it grants letters patent for
a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an
exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated
or used by the Government itself, without just compensation, any more
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land ... 29
The Court found that the sovereign retained no right to make use of patented
devices.30 It reasoned that incentives to invent valuable devices such as
"explosive shells, rams and submarine batteries" would be curtailed were the
government to have the right to infringe a patent without paying just compen-
sation.31
Were Campbell the only precedent on point, one might legitimately
question whether weaker forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights
and trademarks, should also be considered property for the purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. Copyrights and trademarks, after all, do not confer the
same powerful set of exclusive rights as patents, nor do they generally confer
the sort of power in the market that a patent does.32 In 1984, however, in
27. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
28. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357.
29. Id. at 357-58; see Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945)
("That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and by govern-
ment, has long been settled.").
30. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882). This finding was unlike the practice
in the ancient Venetian Republic, which retained prerogative to use freely devices for which it
had issued apatent. See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
166, 177 (1948) (quoting Venetian statute from 1474).
31. Campbell, 104 U.S. at358.
32. See infra notes 61-65. Many unauthorized uses of copyrighted expression and trade-
marks are permitted. For example, independent creation and fair use are both defenses to copy-
right infringement that are unavailable in patent infringement actions. See 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994) (stating that "the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright").
Unauthorized uses of trademarks are common (such as comparative advertising) and are not
actionable in the absence of consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (1994) (stating that person who uses mark is "liable in a civil action" if it "is likely to
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Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that the weakest and least
property-like form of intellectual property, the trade secret, constituted prop-
erty for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.33
In Ruckelshaus, the Court considered a claim by Monsanto that confiden-
tial information it submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
constituted property under Missouri law that was "taken" by the agency when
it was disclosed to Monsanto's competitors.34 Because valuable information
is only legally protectable under trade secret doctrine if it is in fact secret,35
disclosure by the EPA disabled Monsanto's legal right to prevent others from
misappropriating its information.36 The Court held that the federal govern-
ment would have to compensate Monsanto for the value of trade secrets
destroyed without its express or implied consent.37 Noting that it had earlier
found other intangible rights to constitute "property,"3" the Court declared
unequivocally that trade secrets were protected by the Fifth Amendment from
uncompensated governmental takings.3 9
To understand the breadth with which Ruckelshaus defines property, one
must understand what a weak form of property atrade secret is. A trade secret
is "any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others."4 The possessor of the informa-
tion, however, is only protected from the acquisition of the information
through breach of an express or implied promise or through a trespass.4' The
cause confusion"). In addition, it is more difficult to see, especially with trademarks, how the
national interest in the creation of valuable devices usable by the government is enhanced by
the protection of copyrights and trademarks.
33. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
34. Id. at 998-99.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (defining trade
secrets as informndtion that is both valuable and secret).
36. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
37. Id. at 1002-04. The Court also noted that the vehicle for compensation is a claim
under the Tucker Act. Id. at 1016.
38. Id. at 1003; see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,44,46 (1960) (finding that
state law materialman's lien is Fifth Amendment property); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935) (finding that real estate lien is Fifth Amendment
property); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (stating that valid contracts are
Fifth Amendment property).
39. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
40. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39.
41. See id. §§ 40, 43. Section 43 states that "'[i]mproper' means of acquiring another's
trade secret under the rule stated in § 40 include theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of confidence .... "
Relevant case law reveals one extraordinarily narrow exception. See E.I. duPont deNemours
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owner has no right to prevent someone from discovering the secret through
reverse engineering or independent creation or because the owner has not
taken reasonable precautions to keep it secret.42 In other words, the owner of
a trade secret can enforce promises made to keep the information confidential,
and it can sue those who acquire the information through independently
tortious behavior, such as a physical trespass or fraud.43 Obviously, compa-
nies whose information does not qualify as a trade secret have a similar
capacity to protect it through contract" and the prosecution of trespassers and
fraudfeasors.
What does it mean, then, to qualify as the owner of a trade secret? In
essence, being able to prove possession of a trade secret means that one is
entitled to enhanced remedies for breach of contract and for trespass beyond
those that are normally available. A promise not to reveal a trade secret is
enforceable through injunctive relief" and potentially punishable by puni-
tive damages,46 neither of which is available in a suit to enforce a typical
promise.47 When the trade secret is obtained through a physical trespass, such
as through the breaking of a window and the photographing of secret equip-
ment, compensatory damages are measured by the profits that would be lost
if the secret fell into the hands of the owner's competitors or by a reasonable
royalty orby an accounting ofthe infringer's profits.48 They are not measured
& Co. v. Rolfe Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017(5th Cir. 1970) (finding that aerial photogra-
phy of manufacturing plant under construction constituted improper acquisition of trade
secrets).
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMP=rrON § 43 (1995) ("Independent
discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper means of
acquisition.").
43. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text
44. Shrinkwrap licenses are often attempts to protectnonconfidential information through
contract law. Their enforceability outside the trade secret context, however, is controversial.
Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing contract
that restricted buyer beyond limits of intellectual property law) with Vault Corp. v. Quald
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding state statute permitting enforcement
of broad shrinkwrap license void under Supremacy Clause).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPNTION § 44.
46. Id. § 45 cmt. i; see Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating
that court has power to award punitive damages in action for misappropriation of trade secret).
47. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 160 (2d ed.
1998) (noting that "usual form of relief at common law was substitutional... that the plaintiff
recover from the defendant a sum of money"); id. § 12.8, at 192-93 (stating that for breach of
contract actions, "a court will not ordinarily award damages that are described as 'punitive"' and
"[n]o matter how reprehensible the breach, damages are generally limited to those required to
compensate the injured party for lost expectations").
48. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPNETITION § 45(1) (1995) (stating that
monetary remedy should be greater of owner's actual pecuniary loss or misappropriator's gain);
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merely by the cost of replacing the window. In other words, to be the owner
of a trade secret means only that one can recover tort-like remedies for a
breach of promise and contract or unjust enrichment-like remedies for atort.49
This is not to say that trade secrets should not qualify as property for the
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. As the Court noted in Ruckelshaus, trade
secrets bear many attributes traditionally associated with tangible property:
they are assignable,"0 they can form the res of a trust 5 and a debtor's interest
in a trade secret passes to the trustee in bankruptcy.52 Patents, copyrights, and
trademarks53 share all of these attributes with trade secrets.
Trade secrets, however, are a significantly more ephemeral form of
property than patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The term of protection is
uncertain-the moment the secret becomes known through disclosure, reverse
engineering, or independent discovery, legal protection vanishes.5 Due to the
lack of a registration system and the nature of the right itself, trade secrets
often do not have clearly identifiable exclusive owners. Rights and remedies
vary from state to state.56 Licensing is difficult due to the lack of a registra-
tion system and the practical problems created by the fact that one must reveal
a secret in order to market it. 7 The central rationale of the Court in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,s which held that federal patent law did not preempt
state trade secret law, was based on the Court's finding that the level of
protection under trade secret law is significantly inferior to the level of federal
patent protection. 9 State trade secret law did not directly conflict with the
goals and objectives of federal law because the rights afforded trade secret
owners were so weak.60
see also id. § 45 cmt. d (making clear that lost profits may be recovered).
49. See Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual PropertyLaw and the Economics ofPreemption,
76 IowA L. REv. 959, 974-81 (1991) (comparing trade secret and patent protection).
50. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (citing Dr. Miles Med. Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 401-02 (1911)).
51. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. e (1959)).
52. Id. (citing In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1975)).
53. Trademarks, however, may not be assigned without the goodwill of the business or
product that bears the trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).




58. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
59. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482-93 (1974).
60. See id. at 487 (finding that "the potential rewards of patent protection are so far
superior to those accruing to holders of trade secrets").
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If trade secrets are property for the purposes of Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause analysis, then copyrights and trademarks certainly are as
well." In fact, the federal government exercises its eminent domain power
over copyrights just as it does over real property.6' Although neither copy-
right nor trademark law provides the near-absolute exclusivity that patent
protection does,63 they are both far more stable, certain, and property-like
than trade secret law. An owner of a copyright presumptively is entitled to
injunctive relief when someone makes an unauthorized reproduction of her
work.' A trademark owner presumptively is entitled to injunctive relief when
someone uses her mark in a confusing manner.65 The owner of a trade secret,
however, has no presumptive right to prevent a person from making use of
her confidential information because information, in and of itself, has no
61. See Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that when
copyright "is taken for public use, a constitutional right to just compensation attaches"); Roth
v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983) ("An interest in a copyright is a property right
protected by the due process and just compensation clauses of the Constitution."); see also
LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2, at 590-91 & n.11 (2d ed. 1988)
(endorsing broad reading of Ruckelshaus).
62. See Zapruder's JFKAssassination Film in the Public Domain, PUB. DOMAIN REP.,
Feb. 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Zapruder's Film] (reporting that federal government has recently
condemned Zapruder's famous film and paid compensation to his surviving heirs); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1994) (providing compensation for copyright owners whose works are
infringed by federal government). Numerous cases note that the rationale behind a § 1498
recovery is eminent domain. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Decca Ltd. v. United
States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082 (Ct Cl. 1976).
63. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) ("Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which - (A) is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising
or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."), and 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (stating that"[s]ubjectto sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize" reproduction of, preparation of
derivative works of, performance of, and display of copyrighted work), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(Supp. 111996) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (stating that court may grant temporary and final injunc-
tions "to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright").
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994) (stating that court may grant injunction "to prevent the
violation of any right of the registrant of a mark").
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owner.66 One can register one's ownership of a patent, copyright, or trade-
mark in Washington, D.C. There is no similar registry of trade secret owner-
ship nor could one exist. As noted above, the possessor of confidential
information must prove that the information was secret and was improperly
obtained by the user, almost always through the breach of a contract or
trespass.67
Another type of intellectual property, the publicity right, should also
qualify as property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." The right of an
individual to exploit commercially her persona is not protected under federal
law, but as with trade secrets, some states provide substantial legal
protection.69 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, discussing the
right of publicity immediately following its section on trade secrets, describes
the parameters of such protection: "One who appropriates the commercial
value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liabil-
ity...."" Although protection of the right to publicity falls exclusively under
state law, the Supreme Court has analogized the rationale behind the right of
publicity to the purposes underlying federal patent and copyright law.71
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,72 a case involving
publicity rights under Ohio law, the Court explained why federal law grants
property rights to inventors and authors: "The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and the useful Arts."'73 The patent and copyright laws were "in-
66. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,344 (1991) (stating
that "facts are not copyrightable").
67. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
68. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 35-47 (1997) [hereinafter Kwall,
Fame] (concluding that publicity rights should be treated as property after exhaustive discussion
of economics, natural law, Hegelian property theory, and analogies to other kinds of property).
69. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at 547 (stating that about half of states have
recognized right of publicity and that in at least fifteen of those states, legislation exists
regarding this right).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
71. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 (1977) (finding
that First Amendment does not privilege television station's unauthorized broadcast of human
cannonball act because protection provides economic incentive to performer); Roberta Rosen-
thal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
191, 197-98 (1983) [hereinafter Kwall, Right ofPublicity] (discussing rationale for protection
of right of publicity in Zacchini).
72. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
73. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Mazer
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tended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights.'74 In determining that
the First Amendment did not privilege a television station's unauthorized
broadcast of a human cannonball act, the Court in Zacchini found that "[t]he
Constitution does not prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in
deciding to protect the entertainer's incentive in order to encourage the
production of this type of work." 5 The Court considered publicity rights
analogous in policy terms and in function to patents and copyrights, indicating
that it also might be willing to treat them as property for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.76
A brief trip to the local mall or a few minutes of viewing a television
commercial provides ample evidence that merchants recognize the inherent
value of the celebrity persona." Not surprisingly, publicity rights may be
assigned and licensed," and in mostjurisdictions they may be inherited.79 The
protection provided to publicity rights by the law parallels that afforded to
copyright owners. For example, injunctive relief is typically available to
prevent an unauthorized use." As with copyright law, First Amendment
considerations provide the most significant limit on the exclusivity of the
owner's rights.8 ' Although no cases discuss the question, the right to exploit
commercially one's persona would seem to be the sort of property that could
be taken by a state under the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, because the abrogation provisions of the Lanham Act raise the
issue, we must enquire whether the legal shield against false advertising may
be considered a species of "property." Federal law affords protection to
merchants from materially false statements made about their products, and
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
74. Id. at 577 (quoting Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 575-77 (noting that rationale for protecting publicity rights involves per-
former's economic incentive to perform, and economic considerations also underlay patent and
copyright laws); see also Kwall, Right ofPublicity, supra note 71, at 198 (discussing Zacchini).
77. For a comprehensive discussion of the value of the celebrity persona, see Kwall,
Fame, supra note 68.
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995).
79. See id. § 46 cmt h.
80. Id. § 48.
81. See id. § 47 (stating that "the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commen-
tary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such
uses" is not protected); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (stating that fair use of copyrighted work "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright"). See generally
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994) (discussing conflict between protecting right of
publicity and First Amendment limitations on that protection).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 849 (1998)
from materially false statements made by competitors about the competitors'
own products.82 A recent Third Circuit case found that the right to complain
about a competitor's false claim about its products "is not an intangible
property right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment,"83 but reserved the
question of whether the right to be free from false statements made about
one's own products might be properly characterized as protecting a type of
business interest.84
We believe the distinction suggested by the Third Circuit to be logical,
although not because we think business reputation or good will are outside a
plausible definition of property. Measurable damage to a company's good
will looks much like damage to a property interest. An illustration might help.
A state might falsely assert that McDonald's provides the hamburgers served
in its school lunch program. This would constitute a public use of McDon-
ald's good will for the state's benefit and under our analysis constitute a
confiscation of McDonald's property. The diminishment of that same good
will, however, by false statements made by the state attorney general about the
quality of McDonald's products would not seem to be an appropriation of its
property for public use. 5 Its claim should fail for that reason, not because
reputation can never be property.
B. When Is Infringement of Intellectual Property a Fifth
Amendment "Taking?"
Governments interfere with our property every day in innumerable
ways. Some of these intrusions are compensable "takings," but the vast
majority are not. Just because one's property is adversely affected does not
mean a compensable taking has occurred. One must not only prove that one
has affected property, but that the governmental conduct constituted a com-
pensable condemnation. In the intellectual property area, the Supreme Court
has provided two guideposts, James v. Campbell and Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., which hold respectively that the unauthorized use by the post
office of a patented device86 and the improper disclosure by the EPA of a trade
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) (affording protection from those who "in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresent[ ] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities").
83. See College Sav. Bank v. FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d
353, 360 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that "right to be free of false advertising" is not protected
property right), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149).
84. See id. at 362 (expressing "no opinion" about whether property rights protect one
from misrepresentations made about one's goods by competitor).
85. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
86. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1882).
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secret 87 can constitute takings. In order to understand these cases and their
implications for other government encroachments on intellectual property, it
will be helpful to place them in the broader context of takings law.
The Supreme Court has divided the universe of takings cases into roughly
two categories: possessory takings and regulatory takings.8 A government
confiscation of property or a physical occupation of property is a "possessory"
taking and constitutes the strongest sort of claim for compensation. The Court
has articulated a per se rule requiring governmental entities to compensate the
victims of confiscatory takings of real property, no matter how little damage
was done.89 For example, the nonconsensual occupation of just over one
cubic foot of real property constitutes a taking.9" The governmental appropri-
ation of interest accruing in an interpleader account also constitutes a taking.9
On the other hand, the law regarding regulatory takings is notoriously
tortured.92 A "regulatory" taking occurs when a law, regulation, or ordinance
"denies all economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use."93 For example, in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council94 the Court found that a zoning ordinance restrict-
ing all viable use of valuable beachfront property constituted a taking.95 The
land, which was worth almost one million dollars before the ordinance, had
been rendered worthless due to building restrictions on the site.96 Few cases,
however, present such extreme facts, and few regulations effect compensable
takings. Because virtually everything a government does affects the value of
somebody's property, the difficult question in cases of regulation has been:
When has the regulation gone too far?
87. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
88. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, §§ 8.4.2.1-8.4.2.2, at 506-19 (discussing posses-
sory takings and regulatory takings in two separate sections).
89. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(affirming rule that "a permanent physical occupation is a taking" and property owners have
expectation of compensation).
90. See id. at 438 n. 16 (noting that size of displaced property is not important to determin-
ing whether taking occurred).
91. Webb's Fabulous Pharm., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).
92. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.4.2.2, at 511 (noting that problem of when
regulation becomes taking has "confounded courts and commentators").
93. Id. § 8.4.2.2, at 513.
94. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
95. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-32 (1992) (stating
rule that when regulation prohibits all economically beneficial use of land, Takings Clause
requires compensation).
96. See id. at 1006-09 (stating that Lucas had purchased land for $975,000 and was
prohibited from developing it by South Carolina Beachfront Management Act).
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Obviously, the classification of a given encroachment as "possessory"
or "regulatory" has important implications for the outcome of a lawsuit,
both in general and in the particular context of intellectual property. In
general, courts apply the possessory rationale most consistently to situations
in which the government wishes to make use of the owner's property, such
as the temporary exploitation of an owner's business facilities,97 whereas
courts apply the regulatory rationale most frequently when a statute, rule, or
administrative action incidentally has negative effects on the owner's prop-
erty.
The distinction between the two classes of cases is critical because in the
regulatory context "the Court has not found a taking so long as the govern-
mental regulation met a rational basis test and so long as the regulation did not
prevent almost all economically viable use of the property."98 In the posses-
sory or confiscatory context, however, even a small intrusion will constitute
a taking.99 Also, the value of the property at issue need not be destroyed -
mere diminishment of value is enough. As a result, if a city confiscates a
dump truck for one day to haul rocks to a government work site, compensation
must be paid. If, instead, the city passes a reasonable air pollution ordinance
that costs the truck owner thousands in repairs, no compensation need be paid.
Similarly, in the private intellectual property context, when unauthorized
copies of registered blue prints for a new school are made and used by a city,
compensation must be paid under the confiscatory rationale."° On the other
hand, under the regulatory rationale, a city tax on photocopying that raises an
architect's cost of making copies of and distributing his work would fail to
constitute a taking)'O'
The question is identifying which principle is applicable to govern-
ment intrusions on intellectual property. Because intellectual property is
intangible, it cannot, strictly speaking, be "possessed."'0 2 At the same time,
97. See generally Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (discussing
compensation for government's taking of owner's laundry business during WWII).
98. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.4.2.2, at 519.
99. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(holding that "a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property" is taking).
In Loretto, the Court noted that although the appropriation in question displaced only one and
one-half cubic feet, the size of the appropriation was not a factor in determining whether it
constituted a taking. Id. at 438 n. 16.
100. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
102. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 734-41 (discussing notion
that governmental uses of copyrighted property can constitute physical invasions, prohibitive
regulatory measures, or regulations that interfere with property owner's ability to use his
property as he pleases).
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not all encroachments on intellectual property are adequately conceived as
"regulations." The Court's conventional categories are not altogether satisfac-
tory for classifying government intrusions on intellectual property. We think
that, rather than trying to shoehorn intellectual property as a whole into one
category or the other, a better approach is to examine the circumstances of
particular cases. Sometimes the policies of takings law will be better served
by using principles developed in the possessory context; sometimes a regula-
tory focus will be appropriate.
Analogizing to the confiscation analysis better serves the aims of takings
law in cases in which the government has appropriated the property to its own
use, such as when a state official makes unauthorized copies of computer
software rather than buying it or uses patented biotechnology without obtain-
ing permission. Other variations of government conduct may look more like
regulations. For example, governmental regulations do limit intellectual prop-
erty rights in a variety of ways, such as by imposing limits on the exclusive
use of trademarks, 3 permitting "fair use" of copyrighted works,"°4 or by
applying the antitrust laws to intellectual property. We do not dispute that
a regulatory analysis is appropriate in a case in which a party challenges such
rules, nor do we dispute that most of these regulations are valid.
Other cases raise more difficult problems. In Ruckelshaus, where the
government revealed Monsanto's trade secret, the Court clearly found a
taking."0 6 In doing so, it relied on cases typically classified as possessory
takings cases,0 7 but it applied a test derived from regulatory takings cases,
08
focusing on whether Monsanto had a "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 11995) (creating safe harbors for certain unautho-
rized uses of famous trademarks).
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (permitting unauthorized uses of material otherwise pro-
tected by copyright).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (forbidding registration oftrademark used to violate anti-
trust laws).
106. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013-14 (1984).
107. See id at 1005 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979))
(stating that public access to private navigable waterway constituted taking); PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,88 (1980) (stating that public access to private shopping
center did not constitute taking). Chemerinsky describes both as possessory takings cases. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.4.2.1, at 506-09.
108. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (identifying factors that should be taken into
account when courts decide whether taking has occurred); see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,225 (1986) (evaluating whether regulatory taking has occurred by
weighing: "(1) 'the economic impact ofthe regulation on the claimant;' (2) 'the extentto which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;' and (3) 'the
character of the governmental action"' (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
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tion[ ]" that the EPA would keep its information secret.0 9 The regulatory
focus was probably driven by the fact that the EPA made the damaging
disclosure pursuant to amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The Court seemed to view the suit as a challenge
to the regulatory interpretation of those amendments, rather than as an im-
proper act by an agency employee. It concluded that Monsanto had a property
interest in its trade secret, and that the business advantage protectable under
trade secrecy law was destroyed by the EPA's disclosure."0
One could quarrel with the regulatory analogy. Although Monsanto's
secret in Ruckelshaus was revealed, the EPA's disclosure of Monsanto's
information did not prevent Monsanto from continuing to use the information
in its business. The destruction of secrecy only rendered Monsanto unable to
claim the additional remedies that it would have been able to assert under
trade secret law. Monsanto became less able to protect its information, and
the information became significantly less valuable once it was discovered by
competitors. Of course, we have noted above that trade secret laws do not
protect information itself, but rather merely augment pre-existing contract and
tort remedies. Obviously, the disclosure did render the augmented remedies
unavailable. Monsanto, however, characterized its damages as caused by the
loss of its competitive edge. In any event, the EPA did not so much regulate
Monsanto as confiscate its property and constructively dedicate itto the public
domain.
Considerthe consequences of a regulatory analysis in the use-of-intellec-
tual-property context. Under a regulatory taking analysis, an appropriation of
intellectual property would rarely amount to a taking because the owner will
rarely lose all beneficial use of the property. Intellectual property is intangi-
ble, and therefore it is incapable of being physically possessed or taken
away." ' Although the government can condemn a piece of intellectual
property and take title to it or cast it into the public domain,"' the typical
infringement does not divest the property owner of the use of his property."'
109. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005.
110. See id. at 1012 ("The economic value of [Monsanto's] property right lies in the com-
petitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to the data,
and disclosure or use by others of the data would destroy that competitive edge.").
111. Although the federal copyright and patent laws provide for registration, registration
documents are not certificates of title. Ownership does not arise from mere possession of a
registration certificate.
112. See supra note 62 (discussing government's taking of Zapruder's film and placing it
into public domain).
113. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 735-37 (noting that govern-
ment takings can result in personal and professional harm to copyright proprietor, but often
preserve owner's overall use).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYMSAPPROPRIATION
Even if a government is infringing a patent, copyright, or trademark, the
owner may continue to exercise her rights against other infringers. In Camp-
bell, for example, the post office's use of the patented stamping device did not
prevent the patent owner from practicing the patent or suing other infring-
ers." 4 Regulatory takings doctrine provides little solace to owners of intellec-
tual property, Ruckelshaus notwithstanding.
Whatever the merit of characterizing Ruckelshaus as a regulatory taking,
it is both unwise and unnecessary to read Ruckelshaus as standing for a broad
rule that government interference with intellectual property should always be
evaluated under regulatory taking principles. The characterization made no
difference in Ruckelshaus, because a taking could have been found under
either a confiscatory or regulatory rationale. Moreover, the Court apparently
did not considerthis an important issue under the circumstances of the case.'
15
The opinion simply treats the government's actions as a regulatory taking
without explicitly considering whether the confiscatory analysis would have
been more appropriate." 6 For these reasons, Ruckelshaus provides dubious
authority for the proposition that government use of intellectual property
should generally be scrutinized under regulatory taking principles.
Moreover, Ruckelshaus does not expressly tell us how to treat cases in
which governments actually use someone's intellectual property. In this situa-
tion, the principles developed in the context of confiscatory takings seem
most relevant. In Campbell, which was decided in the era before the devel-
opment of the regulatory takings doctrine," 7 the Court analogized a case of
federal patent infringement to the physical possession of real property, the
paradigm confiscatory takings context."' It had no difficulty finding that the
post office's infringement of the owner's patented letter-stamping device
constituted a taking." 9 Because the taking was confiscatory, the fact that the
patent was still economically viable 20 did not defeat the claim, as it would
114. See generally James v. Campbell,. 104 U.S. 356 (1882).
115. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (stating factors courts
should use in determining whether there has been taking without reference to either possessory
or regulatory rationale).
116. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (describing possessory takings cases
cited in Ruckelshaus and how test developed in Ruekelshaus is same).
117. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Mahon is
generally considered the first regulatory takings case.
118. See Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357-58 (stating that government cannot appropriate new
invention without compensation "any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation
land which has been patented to a private purchaser").
119. Id
120. But see Cross, supra note 7, at 552-53 (arguing that device had no economical value
except in hands of government). Cross cites no authority for this assumption. The invention
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in the regulatory context.'
. But the argument for applying the confiscatory standard to cases of
governmental use does not rest solely, or even primarily, on the authority of
Campbell. The premise behind the restrictive rules of regulatory takings
doctrine is not applicable to most invasions of intellectual property. The
reason it is hard to win a regulatory takings case is that the government's
regulation typically has a legitimate aim independent of its impact on the
value of the property, an aim the government is ordinarily free to pursue under
the police power." These aims may be as diverse as environmental protec-
tion, preserving historic landmarks, and promoting general welfare." The
resulting vulnerability to government intrusion is a regrettable but necessary
implication ofthe exercise of government prerogatives. Courts quite properly
hesitate before requiring the state to compensate the property owner just
because achieving a valid regulatory aim has an effect on the use of his
property. It is critical, therefore, to note that in most intellectual property
cases the complained-of government action is not the exercise of the police
power by the passage of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, nor the action of
a zoning board; it is typically the appropriation of patented or copyrighted
materials by bureaucrats or university professors for the state's own use."24
Unlike the typical regulation, there is no good reason for the intrusion, other
than a desire to exploit the property cheaply. When a biochemistry professor
infringes a patent, or a secretary in a governmental agency makes an unautho-
rized copy of registered software, the government has exploited the property
for its own purposes just as if it had temporarily borrowed a private car for
public use. These actions do not look like regulatory takings, nor would
allowing them to go forward advance the legislative prerogative underlying
the narrow nature of the regulatory takings doctrine.
Finally, .the central aim of takings law is to limit the "govern-
ment's power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the general
may well have had multiple uses other than canceling letters. The Court does not rely on the
premise that only the government could use such a device.
121. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (stating
that Fifth Amendment is violated when regulation "denies an owner economically viable use
of his land" (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
122. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,488 (1987)
(noting that government was acting to protect public interest in health and environment);
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (noting that government regulation served to adjust
rights for public good); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978)
(noting that state law did not effect taking because restrictions were related to preserving
historic landmark and promotion of general welfare).
123. See supra note 122 (citing cases regarding varied aims of government takings).
124. See cases cited supra note 6.
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good."" That goal is directly and powerfully implicated in a case in which
the government, without obtaining permission, makes use of intangible
property that belongs to someone else. 26 The intellectual property owner can
be singled out by the state to bear a burden not shared by his fellow citizens.
Unlike evenhanded regulation, which is presumptively valid, an appropriation
looks more like a prohibited attempt to "forc[e] some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."'27 The fact that the target of the taking is intangible should not
prevent it from being partially confiscated within the meaning of the takings
doctrine.' In fact, Congress seems to think that infringement of copyrights
and patents constitutes a confiscation, and it has provided compensation for
owners under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Courts explaining the purpose behind § 1498
state that infringement constitutes "an eminent domain taking."'2 9
C. Remedial Aspects of the Fifth Amendment
The applicability of the Fifth Amendment means that just compensation
will always be available for government appropriations of intellectual prop-
erty that constitute takings, because that provision carves out an exception to
otherwise applicable rules of sovereign immunity. 30 Whatever may be true
125. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 9-6, at 605. For a discussion of the considerations of utility
and fairness underlying this proposition, see Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, andFairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1214-24 (1968).
126. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 694, 728 (noting that gov-
ernment has right to copy protected works, but must pay compensation). There is at least one
case to the contrary. See Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1338 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding
that copyright infringement by government not compensable taking under Tucker Act). In our
view, Porter cannot survive Ruckelshaus. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1020 (1984) (finding that government disclosure of trade secret constitutes compensable taking
under Tucker Act).
127. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
128. Note that in other contexts the intangibility of property rights does not impede their
legal protection. Thus, for example, the Uniform Commercial Code categorizes patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks as "general intangibles," a long recognized category of personal property
that can be bought and sold, and used as collateral under Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-106 cmt.
(1995) (listing property that can be used as commercial security). Moreover, the Supreme Court
has extended constitutional protection to intangible personal property. See, e.g., Armstrong,
364 U.S. at 49 (stating that Fifth Amendment protects materialman's lien); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (stating that contract rights are property protected by Fifth
Amendment).
129. See Teletronix v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Decca Ltd. v.
United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
130. See generally Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6.
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of violations of other constitutional and statutory directives, the Supreme
Court declared in First English EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County ofLos
Angeles' that "in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required
by the Constitution." '132 Notwithstanding principles of sovereign immunity,
the state and federal governments must provide remedies for takings of prop-
erty.
133
In ordinary situations, governments themselves typically institute con-
demnation proceedings. This procedure has been used for appropriations of
intellectual property as well.13 The difficult issues arise in situations in
which a government simply uses or damages someone's property, without
undertaking to condemn it first. In such circumstances, First English requires
that the government submit to an inverse condemnation suit brought by the
property owner to determine whether a taking occurred and the value of the
property taken. 135 It bears emphasizing that the sole remedy available in such
a suit is the value of the property. A property owner normally cannot obtain
injunctive relief as a matter of constitutional right.
36
Governments have the privilege of litigating these suits in their own
courts. When the federal government is the target, the case may be brought
in federal court under the Tucker Act 137 or 28 U.S.C. § 1498. State govern-
ments must allow such suits to be brought against themselves and against local
131. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
132. First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,316 (1987).
133. Id. at 316 n.9; see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ETAL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THEFEDERAL SYsTEM 849 & n. 1, 1029 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER] (describing Just Compensation Clause as dictating remedy for interference with
property rights). Courts may compel compensatory remedies for constitutional violations in
other circumstances as well. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 111 (1994) (stating that
due process requires states to provide clear and certain remedy for unconstitutionally collected
state taxes). Compare Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception,"
110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 125 & n.161 (1996) (stating that adequate relief required) with
Vzquez, supra note 16, at 1770-73 (stating that remedy not required). This debate, however,
is not directly relevant to the present inquiry. First English makes it clear that takings claims
require a remedy, regardless of how the general issue is resolved.
134. See Zapruder's Film, supra note 62, at 1 (reporting that federal government has
condemned Zapruder's famous film and paid compensation to his surviving heirs).
135. See First English, 482 U.S. at 315 (discussing right of landowner to bring inverse
condemnation suit).
136. See id. at 321 (noting that compensation consists of value of property for period
during which taking was effective).
137. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1994) (definingjurisdiction of federal district court);
see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1016-19 (1984) (holding that adequate remedy
for government taking of Monsanto's trade secret was available under Tucker Act and equitable
relief was not available); see also HART& WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1028-29 (discussing
Tucker Act).
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governments in their own courts.' Otherwise, a federal suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deprivation of property without due process of law will be avail-
able against the local government or state officers responsible for the injury.139
Such suits are also available against officers who take property without
authorization of the government for which they work. In a § 1983 suit, the
remedies may be far broader than 'just compensation.'0
40
11 Protection Beyond the Takings Clause:
Legislation Abrogating Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Seminole Tribe,
and City of Boerne
In the eyes of intellectual property owners, the Takings Clause provides
some, but hardly adequate, protection against government encroachments.
Although compensation must be paid even when the damage done is min-
138. See First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,315-16
n.9 (1987) (discussing landowners' right to bring inverse condemnation actions); cf HART &
WECHsLER, supra note 133, at 1054 (discussing argument over whether unconsenting states can
be held liable in federal courts).
Professor Kwall suggests that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) would preclude state courtjurisdiction
over takings claims that involve copyrights. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra
note 6, at 764. We respectfully disagree. Section 133 8(a) grants federal courts exclusive juris-
diction over suits "arising under" federal copyright law. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). A takings
claim does not "arise under" federal copyright law, but rather is grounded in the Fifth Amend-
ment itself.
ProfessorKwall also argues that 17 U.S.C. § 301, which preempts state laws that provide
protection "equivalent" to federal copyright law, preempts the application of state remedies for
takings of copyrighted property. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 764-
65. Because a state is obligated by the Fourteenth Amendment to provide just compensation
to property owners, we fail to see how Congress could relieve states of that obligation by
statute. Section 301 preemption in this context appears to be unconstitutional. Congress could,
because it has the power to create and define copyright protection, declare prospectively that
copyrighted material can be used freely by the states. It has, however, done just the opposite.
See supra notes 1-3.
139. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194-97 (1985) (discussing state procedures for seeking just compensation).
140. One may obtain injunctive relief against an officer under the principle of Exparte
Young. See generally Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that federal courts can
enjoin state officials in their official capacities). See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690
(1978) (applying Exparte Young). Compensatory damages may include not only the value of
the property, but also recovery for such items as emotional distress, providing they can be
proved. See, e.g., Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986);
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978). Punitive damages may be obtained against an
officer who acts egregiously. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Successful plaintiffs
are generally entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(1994).
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imal, 4 ' or the deprivation is temporary, 142 the measure of compensation is
primarily restitutional. In the intellectual property context, no more than a
reasonable royalty is probably due the owner under the Fifth Amendment.
1 43
This result is suggested by Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States'" in which
the Court held that proper compensation for the temporary taking of a laundry
business for military purposes was its rental value during the time of the
taking, not the difference between the market value of the business before and
after the taking.141
The likely limitation of damages to a reasonable royalty helps explain
why copyright and patent owners were not satisfied with the remedies avail-
able to them under the Fifth Amendment and fought to convince Congress that
a direct action for infringement should be available against the states. In
addition, under takings law, a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to an injunc-
tion, nor can the plaintiff recover certain types of compensatory damages
146
or trebled or punitive damages.147 By contrast, under federal patent, copy-
right, trademark, and false advertising law, an injunction is presumptively
available,' as are other sorts of enhanced remedies. 49 Injunctions are also
141. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(requiringjust compensation for unobtrusive television cable installation in apartmentbuilding).
142. See First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987) (stating that compensation must be paid, even when taking is temporary).
143. See Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding
that reasonable royalty, not lost profits, is preferred measure of recovery in patent infringement
suits against United States), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1466 (1997).
144. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
145. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1949).
146. See id. (denying recovery in takings case for difference between market value of
laundry business before and after taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
379 (1945) (denying recovery for "future loss of profits, ... the loss of good-will which inheres
in the location of the land, or other like consequential losses which would ensue the sale of the
property to someone other than the sovereign").
147. At any rate, we have found no authority for such a recovery, and the logic of takings
law suggests that the property owner is entitled to compensation and nothing more. Cf City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) ("[C]onsiderations of history and
policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad-faith actions of
its officials.").
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1994) (court may grant injunctions in trademark and false
advertising cases); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (court may grant injunction in copyright case); 35
U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (court may grant injunction in patent case).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) (court may award treble damages for trademark
infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994) (court may award statutory damages from $20,000
to $100,000); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (court may award treble damages for patent infringe-
ment).
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available to plaintiffs under state trade secret and publicity rights law, 5' and
such plaintiffs can also recover punitive damages.' An owner is substan-
tially better off as the prevailing party in an infringement action than in a
takings claim.'52
Another reason why plaintiffs would prefer to file suit under the federal
intellectual property statutes is that although takings actions against state and
local governments must be brought in state courts, federal court is available
for patent, copyright, and trademark actions. For a variety of reasons, federal
judges are likely to be more sympathetic than state courts to claims based on
federal law. Federal judges enjoy life tenure and undiminishable salary, while
many state judges must stand for election and generally depend upon state
legislatures for their salaries.' Federal courts maintain a strong tradition of
vigilance in defense of federal rights.'54 Talent probably plays a larger role
in the selection of federal judges than in the selection of state judges.' For
all these reasons, the disparity between federal and state courts may make the
difference between winning and losing in close cases on the facts or the
law.'56 Given that state court remedies were already available under the
Takings Clause,'57 this "substantive" theme may well have influenced Con-
gress when it enacted the abrogating legislation. 8
150. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFUNFAIRCOMPETITION §§ 44,48 (1995) (statingthatinjunc-
tive relief may be awarded for misappropriation of trade secrets and publicity rights).
151. See Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1972) (allowing punitive
damage award for misappropriation of trade secrets); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMP~rrrON § 45 cmt. i (stating that successful plaintiff in action for appropriation of trade
secret may recover punitive damages); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1104-
06(9th Cir. 1992) (allowing punitive damage award for voice misappropriation); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. e (stating that punitive damages are available to
plaintiffs in right of publicity actions).
152. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
153. See Neubome, supra note 11, at 1127-28 (noting that federal district judges are
appointed for life and state court judges are more vulnerable to political pressure).
154. See id. at 1124-25 (discussing psychological and attitudinal characteristics of state and
federal judges).
155. See id. at 1121-24 (discussing technical competence of state and federal judges); see
also Burt Neubome, Parity Revisited: The Uses ofaJudicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1995) (discussing performance of state and federal trial judges).
156. See Michael Wells, Who'sAfraidofHenryHart?, 14CONST. COMMENT. 175,184-86
(1997) (addressing "weak parity" between federal and state courts).
157. See supra Part I (addressing relief available to intellectual property owners under
Takings Clause).
158. Cf Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 472-74 (1991) (stating that it is appropriate for Congress
to consider such factors in allocating jurisdiction between federal and state courts).
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Champions of intellectual property rights succeeded in securing enact-
ment of abrogating legislation in the early 1990s, ' and the federal intellectual
property statutes accorded them the sweeping remedies previously noted.
Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe,60 owners of intellectual
property felt confident that the abrogating legislation was constitutional
because the Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 6' had broadly authorized
Congressional abrogation of state immunity, so long as Congress clearly
stated its intent. 62 Seminole Tribe cast doubt on the legislation, for it substan-
tially restricts Congress's abrogating power. At the same time, however,
Seminole Tribe did not necessarily undercut the remedial scheme enacted in
the early 1990s. Seminole Tribe held that Congress may not abrogate state
Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting solely under its Article I powers,
such as the power to regulate commerce among the states Or the power to
grant patents and copyrights.'63 The Court, however, reaffirmed earlier cases
ruling that Congress may abrogate immunity when acting under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to enforce the consti-
tutional rights protected by that amendment." In 1997, the Supreme Court
in City of Boerne v. Flores'65 addressed the scope of congressional power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part examines the impact
of Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne on the abrogating legislation that
purported to make state governments fully responsible for their appropriations
of intellectual property. We argue that the abrogating legislation can largely,
and perhaps entirely, survive the restrictive rule of Seminole Tribe.'66
159. See supra notes 1-4.
160. For a general overview of the case and its background, see generally Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
161. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
162. Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1989) (determining that Congress
may abrogate state immunity when acting under any of its powers), overruled by Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242-43 (1985) (stating that Congress has power to abrogate state immunity, however, it must
express its intent to do so in language of statute).
163. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
164. Id. at 59-62.
165. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
166. Our emphasis is on problems raised by Congress's effort to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity. This objection to the abrogation legislation should be distinguished from
an objection based on the states' Tenth Amendment right to be free of certain types of substan-
tive regulation. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (finding that
Congress may not oblige local sheriffs to perform background checks on gun permit applicants);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (finding that Congress may not oblige
states either to create toxic waste dump sites or take title to waste).
A Tenth Amendment attack on the abrogating legislation is bound to fail because that
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A. What Is a "State?"
Before considering the impact of Seminole Tribe on intellectual property
rights, it is useful to delineate as precisely as possible the potential scope of
sovereign immunity. To say that the "states" may assert sovereign immunity
raises an important issue: What is a "state?" The Eleventh Amendment
presumptively divests a federal court of its power to hear the case not only
when a state itself is named as a defendant, but also when any "arm of the
state" is named as such. Accordingly, given the relevance of the question
whether state universities, which are frequent defendants in intellectual
property litigation, should be considered arms of the state, an appropriate
starting point for our inquiry into sovereign immunity is to define what is
meant by a "state" for the purposes of the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
A suit brought against the "State of Georgia" is, of course, a suit against
a state for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. A suit brought against
a statewide agency is also considered to be a suit against the state itself.67 A
suit against a county or city, however, is not considered to be a suit against the
state.'68 Nor is a suit against a multistate regional agency considered to be a
suit against the state, when the states involved are not responsible for the
agency's debts.169 In general, the Court has indicated that "when the action is
in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real,
substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity
from suit."'70
In its most recent decision on the issue, Regents of the University of
California v. Doe,' the Court noted that determining whether an entity is an
amendment forecloses regulation only in circumstances in which Congress has singled out the
states. The Tenth Amendment does not bar Congress from applying laws of general applicabil-
ity to the states. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985)
(stating that minimum wage and overtime laws are not "destructive of state sovereignty"). The
intellectual property laws covered by the abrogating legislation are also laws of general applica-
bility.
167. See generally, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (involving suit against
Illinois Department of Public Aid); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945) (involving suit against Indiana Department of Treasury).
168. See generally, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.-v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) (involving suit against county school board); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552
(1900) (involving suit against city).
169. See generally, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)
(involving suit against New York-New Jersey agency); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'I PlanningAgency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (involvingsuitagainstCalifornia-Nevadaagency).
170. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464.
171. 519 U.S. 425 (1997).
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arm of the state involves an examination of the "relationship between the State
and the entity in question."'72 The Court looked at "the essential nature and
effect of the proceeding" '173 and the "nature of the entity created by state
law." 74 In practice, this overall inquiry seems to focus primarily on whether
the state would be obligated to satisfy ajudgment rendered against the defen-
dant entity.175 In Regents v. Doe, the Court considered a Ninth Circuit ruling
that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, operated by the Board of
Regents of the California university system, was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court because the Department of
Energy was contractually obligated to indemnify the laboratory if it were to
lose a lawsuit. 76 Because money was unlikely to flow from the state's coffers
into the pocket of the defendant, the Ninth Circuit allowed the suit against the
lab to proceed.'77
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "it is the entity's potential
legal liability, rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to
reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the first instance, that is
relevant.' ' Declining to address the ultimate issue of whether the laboratory
was an arm of the state, the Court reversed on other grounds. 79 Given the
Ninth Circuit's prior acceptance of the position that the University of Califor-
nia system is generally an arm of the state, one would expect the cause of
action against the laboratory to be dismissed.'
172. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
173. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
174. Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Rd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977)).
175. See id. at 430 ("[lT]he question whether a money judgment against a state instrumen-
tality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any
evaluation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued.").
176. See id. at 426-28 (describing Ninth Circuit ruling and question for Supreme Court
review); see also Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 65 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997).
177. See Lawrence Livermore, 65 F.3d at 774.
178. Regents, 519 U.S. at431.
179. Id. at 431-32.
180. See BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that University
of California system is instrumentality of state). The Ninth Circuit applies a five-factor test to
determine whether an entity is an arm of the state. The five factors are as follows:
(1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, (2) whether the
entity performs central governmental functions, (3) whether the entity may sue or
be sued, (4) whether the entity has power to take property in its own name or only
the name of the state, and (5) the corporate status of the entity.
Lawrence Livermore, 65 F.3d at 774-75.
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The question of whether state universities are arms of the state for the
purpose of establishing their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court is especially important in the intellectual property context. A
substantial portion of the nation's research and development in the fields of
medicine, biotechnology, computer science, and engineering is conducted
under the auspices of large public universities."' In addition, universities
typically photocopy large amounts of copyrighted materials in the everyday
course of their business.' They are likely defendants in any number of
misappropriation suits.' Although the Court has not answered this question
definitively, the majority of lower courts that have addressed the question
have assumed state universities to be arms of the state for the purpose of
asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity.' " Putting aside until later the case
of state officials sued in their official capacities, an entity that successfully
proves it is an arm of the state presumptively is entitled to absolute immunity
from suit in federal court, irrespective of the nature of the cause of action
pleaded against it.
B. Seminole Tribe and the Revival of State Sovereign Immunity
Let us assume, then, that the defendant agency is indeed the "state." In
1992, Congress plainly and expressly abrogated state Eleventh Amendment
immunity in cases of violations of federal patent, copyright, trademark, and
false advertising law."8 Federal law is silent as to trade secrets and publicity
181. Cf Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931,935 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (detailing
university's role in biotechnology research).
182. Cf Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (detailing common practice of professorial creation and photocopying
of copyrighted materials in "coursepacks," although in this case defendant was for-profit,
commercial copy service), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
183. See supra note 6.
184. See generally, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995)
(finding that copyright and false advertising claims brought against state university press are not
barred by Eleventh Amendment), vacatedsub nom. University of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S.
1184 (1996) (mem.); Genentech, Inc., 998 F.2d 931 (finding patent suit against state university
not barred by Eleventh Amendment); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(finding patent suit against State of California barred by Eleventh Amendment); Richard
Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding copyright suit against
state university barred by Eleventh Amendment).
185. The Court will never imply abrogation. Congress must be absolutely clear when it
intends to override the Eleventh Amendment. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 243 (1985) (requiring "unmistakable language in the statute itself"). There is little doubt
that Congress has spoken clearly as to patent, copyrights, and trademarks. See supra notes 1-3
(providing statutory language). All courts that have considered the question agree. See gener-
ally College Say. Bank v. FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353 (3d
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rights claims; therefore, a plaintiff must still bring those causes of action
against a state exclusively in state court, if at all. 8'
Our inquiry will focus on the validity of Congress's abrogation of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity for patent, trademark, copyright, and false adver-
tising claims. Some courts and commentators maintain that Seminole Tribe
renders these statutes unconstitutional. 8 7 To the contrary, we contend that
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to
bring states within the jurisdiction of the federal courts in most cases involv-
ing appropriations of federally protected intellectual property.
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court severely restricted Congress's
power to abrogate state immunity from federal court suit. The issue in Semi-
nole Tribe was whether Congress had acted constitutionally in depriving the
states of immunity in certain actions brought under the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act.'88 Striking down the legislation by a five-to-four vote, the Court
overruled its previous holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. that Con-
gress could force states into federal court to comply with regulations it had
Cir. 1997) (determining that false advertising claims by state agency are not barred by Eleventh
Amendment), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149);
Chavez, 59 F.3d 539 (determining that copyright and false advertising claims brought against
state university press are not barred by Eleventh Amendment); Genentech, 998 F.2d 931
(determining that patent suit against state university not barred by Eleventh Amendment); Better
Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 904 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (holding that federal
unfair competition suit against state agency is not barred by Eleventh Amendment), affd sub
nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 689 (1998); Unix Sys. Lab., Inc.
v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1993) (concluding that copyright
and trademark causes of action against state university are not barred by Eleventh Amendment,
but trade secret claim is barred).
186. Cf Chavez, 59 F.3d at 547 (noting thatplaintiffconceded that abrogation of immunity
in copyright and trademark cases did not extend to publicity rights claim).
187. See Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that majority decision "prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad
range of actions against States, [including] those sounding in copyright and patent law");
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1998)
(holding legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity in copyright cases to be unconstitu-
tional under Seminole Tribe); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 954 n.6
(S.D. Cal. 1996) ("If the issue were whether the patent code abrogates the state's immunity, then
Seminole Tribe would apply, and would probably compel the conclusion that the patent code
cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity."); Cross, supra note 7, at 523
(concluding that abrogating legislation "cannot be justified as exercises of Congress's Four-
teenth Amendment power"); Williamson, supra note 7, at 1752 ("It's highly unlikely that
Congress could remove the Copyright and Patent Acts from Seminole's reach .... insofar as
they abrogate the sovereign immunity of states and state agencies, both Acts' sovereign
immunity provisions are unconstitutional after Seminole .... ).
188. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996); see 25 U.S.C. § 2710
(1994).
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passed under its Commerce Clause powers.189 In fact, the Court went so far
as to find that Congress lacked the power to abrogate state Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity under any of its Article I powers,'" holding in particular that
the Indian Commerce Clause191 could not be invoked by Congress. 2 At the
same time, the Court reaffirmed a twenty-year-old rule that state immunity
from suit in federal court can be overridden when Congress acts pursuant to
its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
Seminole Tribe, with its distinction between legislation enacted pursuant
to Article I powers and section 5 legislation, turns on the Court's understand-
ing of sovereign immunity. A narrow majority of the justices take the view
that the immunity pre-dates the Eleventh Amendment. Relying on Hans v.
Louisiana, 1 4 they maintain that the immunity is of constitutional dimension
and entered the Constitution when the document was ratified in 1788, at the
same time as the Article I powers. 9 The Eleventh Amendment itself is
merely a surgical correction of a 1793 case, Chisholm v. Georgia,'96 that
erroneously denied a state's immunity claim against an out-of-state plaintiff. 
97
The constitutional status of the immunity shields the states from suits in
federal court based on causes of action grounded in Article I legislation.
Section 5 cases are different because the Fourteenth Amendment was not
enacted until 1868 and represents a deliberate decision to restrict state prerog-
atives in ways that were not contemplated in 1788. In contrast to Congress's
Article I powers, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Con-
gress the power to enforce the amendment's proscriptions "by appropriate
legislation,"'98 does authorize Congress to abrogate state immunity. The
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to "fundamentally alter[ ] the balance of
189. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
190. Id. at 72-73.
191. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress has power to regulate com-
merce "with the Indian Tribes").
192. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
193. Id. at 59-60; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I (stating that state may not "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); id. § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
194. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
195. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
196. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
197. See HART& WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1047 (discussing Chisholm). In the view
reflected in Hans and Seminole Tribe, this circumstance explains the narrow wording of the
Eleventh Amendment, which by its terms only protects states against suits by "Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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state and federal power struck by the Constitution" '99 and therefore overrides
the Eleventh Amendment.
Of course, not everyone agrees with this account of sovereign immunity
and the Eleventh Amendment. Contrary views that recognize broader Con-
gressional power have won strong support with the Supreme Court and in the
academic literature. Fourjustices dissented in Seminole Tribe.200 Just seven
years earlier, the Court in Union Gas held, again by a five-to-four margin, that
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting under Article
I powers.20' The weight of scholarly opinion, for whatever it may be worth,
is on the side of the Seminole Tribe dissenters.20 2 Our project, however, is to
examine the current state of the law as it relates to intellectual property, not
to enter into the debate over the accuracy of Seminole Tribe. We take the
decision as a given while noting that it may not be the last word in the area.
In addition, as we conclude that the legislation abrogating state sovereign
immunity in patent, copyright, and trademark cases is authorized by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the somewhat shaky foundation of Seminole Tribe
does not threaten the constitutionality of that legislation. The holding of
Seminole Tribe is clear: Congress may only abrogate states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity when it properly enforces rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. It follows that the scope of Congressional power under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a key to determining whether Congress
acted constitutionally in abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent,
copyright, and trademark cases.
C. City of Boerne and the Abrogation Statutes:
The Scope of CongressionalAuthority Under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court has recently cleared up much of the confusion
surrounding the meaning of the section 5 enforcement provision of the Four-
teenth Amendment.0 3 It held in City ofBoerne v. Flores that section 5 was
199. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
200. See id. at 76, 100 (identifying dissenting justices).
201. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
202. See Meltzer, supra note 160, at 7-13 (discussing scholarly debate over Eleventh
Amendment and state sovereign immunity).
203. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996); see U.S. CoNST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (stating that state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws");
id. § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.").
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a purely remedial provision.2" In other words, Congress can combat pre-
existing constitutional violations under section 5, but may not expand the
substantive protections provided by a particular provision of the Bill of
Rights, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
In City of Boerne, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), °' legislation specifically passed
to overturn the Court's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith.206 Smith
held that the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion was not
violated by "generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct."
207
Although neutral laws passed with an antireligion motivation may still be
declared unconstitutional, 28 the decision made it impossible to challenge a
neutral, generally applicable law on the grounds that it merely burdened the
free exercise of religion. In response, Congress passed RFRA, mandating the
application of a balancing test" 9 in cases involving challenges to state laws
that burden religion. Under RFRA, governments at all levels were forbidden
from placing "substantial[ ] "burden[s]" on a person's exercise of religion,
even if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government could demonstrate both a "compelling governmental interest" in
its law and that the regulation was the "least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.,
210
A powerful attack on RFRA was mounted by the city of Boerne, Texas,
in defense of its historic preservation ordinance after the city had denied the
application of a local historic church to expand its facilities.211 When the city
refused the permit, the church sued, arguing that under RFRA it did not have
to comply with the ordinance.212 The church's claim under the RFRA balanc-
ing test was quite strong. Without the needed renovations, some forty to sixty
parishioners were being turned away from some Sunday masses.213 To justify
204. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-63 (1997).
205. Id. at 2172.
206. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
207. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
208. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523-24
(1993) (striking down municipal regulation of animal slaughtering as impermissibly directed
at burdening practice of Santeria).
209. InframingRFRA, Congresswas influencedbySherbertv. Verner, an earlier Supreme
Court case. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963) (holding that in absence of
compelling governmental interest, state may not punish individual who does not obey law that
substantially burdens his free exercise rights).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
211. City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997).
212. Id.
213. Il
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this clear burden on religion, the city could not have asserted a public health
or safety rationale, but rather would have been forced to argue that its aes-
thetic interests were compelling. Not surprisingly, it argued primarily that the
power to enact RFRA itself was beyond the powers delegated to Congress by
the Constitution." 4
The church, supported by the Solicitor General's office, sought to justify
RFRA as a proper exercise of Congress's powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."5 The Court agreed that Congress can properly
legislate against practices that violate rights protected by the First Amend-
ment.216 It reaffirmed that under Smith, however, the enforcement of a gener-
ally applicable historic preservation ordinance against a church almost cer-
tainly did not violate the First Amendment." 7 The Court reserved for itself
the ultimate right to define what constituted a violation of a constitutional
right.218 Congress could not overrule Smith by statute.
The Court grounded its holding, in part, in the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2"9 The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had
deliberately rejected an alternative formulation of the amendment, drafted by
Congressman Bingham, that would have given Congress the power to define
constitutional protections." The framers rejected it because it "would [have]
give[n] Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibil-
ity, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution."'22
Accordingly, a new draft was prepared, under which "Congress' [s] power was
no longer plenary but remedial. Congress was granted the power to make the
substantive constitutional prohibitions against the States effective."' In this
form, the amendment was ratified.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2162-63.
216. Id. at2163-64.
217. Id. at2161.
218. Id. ("Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said
to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
it is.").
219. Id. at2164-66.
220. See id. at 2164. That version stated:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2165.
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Apart from this federalism argument, the Court in City of Boerne noted
that opponents of the Bingham draft invoked another structural principle of
constitutional government: the separation of powers among the branches of
the national government. The Court recognized that "[tjhe first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmen-
tal action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those prohibi-
tions." A problem with the initial draft was that it "departed from that tradi-
tion by vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the
meaning of the new Amendment through legislation." 4 In the later, success-
ful draft, "the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the
States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. The
power to interpret the constitution in a case or controversy remains in the
judiciary. '
The distinction between the "remedial and preventive" legislation autho-
rized by section 5 and legislation that defines constitutional rights, which is
forbidden," 6 will sometimes be hard to apply. The Court in City of Boerne
devoted several pages to distinguishing RFRA from 1960s voting rights
legislation that forbids certain practices, such as literacy tests, that the Court
had earlier found constitutional. 7 "Preventive rules" like those found in the
voting rights legislation, are "appropriate remedial measures" under section
5 only when there is "a congruence between the means used and the ends to
be achieved.""8 The Court recognized that "[s]trong measures appropriate to
address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.""
In the voting rights context, the legislation addressed "widespread and persist-
ing deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country's history
of racial discrimination.""0 By contrast, "RFRA's legislative record lack[ed]
examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry.""1
Although the City of Boerne distinction between remedial and defini-




226. See id. (discussing "remedial and preventive" nature of Congress's enforcement power,
which is constitutional, and legislation "generally upon" life, liberty, and property, which is
unconstitutional).
227. Id. at2166-71.
228. Id at 2169.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2167.
231. Id. at2169.
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statutes abrogating immunity for copyright, patent, and trademark infringe-
ments is straightforward. Unlike RFRA, the abrogating statutes do not define
rights. These statutes merely provide effective remedies for violations of the
intellectual property statutes by removing a barrier that may otherwise stand
in the way of relief. Like the abrogation of state immunity from federal sex
discrimination suits upheld by the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,"2
Congress's abrogation in the intellectual property contexthas merelyprovided
remedies against the states for pre-existing wrongs of constitutional dimension.
Seminole Tribe, of course, requires that the wrong remedied by Congress
be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have provided the main
reason why the abrogating legislation is designed to remedy a Fourteenth
Amendment wrong: Virtually all state infringements of patents, copyrights,
and trademarks without payment of just compensation are violations of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 The Fifth Amendment was the
first section of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 In other words, to the extent that Congress provides a remedy
for an uncompensated taking of property by a state, it addresses a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a response that is presumptively authorized by
section 5 and City of Boerne. We have shown in Part I that the interests
delineated by the intellectual property statutes are constitutionally protected
property."5 Insofar as the question of the availability of suit under the copy-
right, patent, and trademark statutes is whether Congressional power is exer-
cised under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are confident that the
abrogating legislation passes muster.
As we discussed in Part I, acts of infringement by a state government are
best analogized to partial confiscations of property. Confiscation by the state
is a per se taking of property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The abrogating legislation is only directed at acts of infringement committed
232. 427 U.S. 445,447-48 (1976) (upholding application ofTitle VII employment discrim-
ination remedies against states).
233. See supra Part I.
234. See supra note 15.
235. See supra Part I. The congruence between violations of the intellectual property
statutes and violations of property rights may not be complete. On the facts of a given case, a
particular infringement may not rise to the level of an unconstitutional interference with
property rights. See, e.g., College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that abrogation of state immunity in some
types of false advertising suits does not remedy constitutional deprivation of property, and
therefore is not valid), petition for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-
149). Such a case would present the question of whether allowing the suit to proceed would
nevertheless serve the goal of effectively remedying constitutional violations. As City of
Boerne's distinction between RFRA and voting rights legislation indicates, the answer may turn
on the facts of particular cases.
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by states. It does not render states generally liable if they pass statutes and
regulations that may negatively affect the value of intellectual property. Such
regulations would seldom constitute a taking. In other words, the fit between
the remedy (abrogation) and the constitutional wrong (taking by infringement)
is close enough to satisfy the City of Boerne test.
Two further aspects of the section 5 issue need to be addressed. The
abrogating statutes permit injunctive relief against state governments, as well
as extra-compensatory damages. Neither of these forms of relief may be
obtained as a matter of constitutional right in a suit for a "taking" of property.
Assuming that Congress may grant federal courts jurisdiction over claims that
state governments have unlawfully intruded on interests in intellectual prop-
erty, does it follow that Congress may authorize, consistent with the limits on
its section 5 power, remedies that are not available in the state courts?
We believe the provisions for injunctions and extra-compensatory dam-
ages are well within Congress's section 5 authority. City of Boerne distin-
guishes between legislation that defines the scope of constitutional protection
and legislation that provides remedies for violations of rights recognized by
the courts. The abrogating statutes do not define constitutionally protected
"property," but only provide remedies deemed by Congress to be necessary to
the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights. In fact, the remedies
for injunctive relief available under federal intellectual property laws may not
typically go beyond the remedies available to the victims of violations of the
Takings Clause. Case law seems to provide for a grant of injunctive relief to
the victim whose property is taken by a state official in the course of her
duties who is not authorized under state law to condemn the property. 6 In
other words, when the official confiscating the property is a professor or
bureaucrat, injunctive relief is probably already available. We assume, of
course, that the proper state authority could later ratify the rogue official's
action and offer to pay just compensation for any future use of the property.
Nothing in the abrogating legislation of the intellectual property law should
be interpreted as ultimately preventing a state from properly exercising its
constitutional power to take property for public use."
236. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 698-99 & n.21
(1949). The court stated that
specific relief in connection with property held or injured by officers of the sover-
eign acting in the name of the sovereign has been granted only where there was a
claim that the taking of property or the injury to it was not the action of the sover-
eign because unconstitutional or beyond the officers statutory powers ....
Id.; cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) ("Equitable relief is not
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for public use, duly authorized by law,
when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign for the taking.") (emphasis
added).
237. We doubt, however, that a state could entirely condemn a copyright, patent, or
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The Court in City of Boerne stressed that the courts have, ever since
Marbury v. Madison, 8 had the final say in determining the content of consti-
tutional rights. 9 An equally time-honored tradition is Congress's role in
authorizing remedies for constitutional violations. Although the courts should
participate in this effort as well, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
primary responsibility for making constitutional remedies belongs to Con-
gress.240 We know of no case in which the Court has invalidated a Congres-
sional remedy for constitutional violations on the ground that Congress
accorded greater protection than the Constitution requires.
Finally, an objection might be raised that the abrogating statutes autho-
rize a suit against the state before a constitutional violation has occurred
because a violation of the Takings Clause is typically not complete until the
state refuses to pay compensation. In other words, the statute might be seen
as sanctioning primarily constitutional conduct, in violation of the principle
stated in City of Boerne, insofar as it does not require plaintiffs to exhaust
their state remedies first. In response, we note, as we did above, that the vast
majority of the infringements we describe are perpetrated by state officials
who lack statutory authority to exercise their state's power of eminent domain.
In those situations, case law indicates that the cause of action for relief arises
immediately.24' In other words, we believe the "fit" required by City of
Boerne is still quite-tight if we are right that the typical infringement resem-
bles an inverse condemnation of property by an official without eminent
domain authority, as opposed to a proper exercise of the state's constitutional
right to offer reasonable compensation for the public use of a private citizen's
property.
D. Two Post-Seminole Tribe Decisions
The only two courts to have considered the constitutionality of legislation
abrogating state sovereign immunity in cases involving federal intellectual
property have come to opposite conclusions.
trademark, take title to it, and then attempt to exclude others from using it.
238. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
239. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
240. See generally Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367 (1983). See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 877.
241. See First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 316
(1987); supra text accompanying notes 134-36. Of course, the case may not yet be ripe for
adjudication in federal court. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172; 186 (1985) (stating that due process claim based on illegal taking theory
not ripe until inverse condemnation action brought by victim against state). The abrogation
statute can be seen as bypassing any ripeness objection, something Congress can do as long as
the state remedy exhaustion requirement is not of constitutional dimension. For a discussion
of why it is not, see infra text accompanying notes 373-78.
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In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,242 the Federal Circuit found that "[i]n subjecting the states to
suit in federal court for patent infringement, Congress sought to prevent states
from depriving patent owners of their property without due process through
infringing acts."243 After discussing Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne, it
concluded that abrogation "comport [ed] with the text and judicial interpreta-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment."'2 Although its treatment of the jurisdic-
tional precedent is convincing, the court did little to prove its conclusion that
the state's action constituted a taking of property apart from citing older case
law that characterizes a patent as "property." In other words, it did not engage
in any detailed analysis of whether an infringement constitutes an unconstitu-
tional taking of that property, which, as we have seen, is the more difficult
question.
In Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,245 the Fifth Circuit took a different
approach and held in a confusing opinion that a claim for copyright infringe-
ment could not constitutionally be brought against a state after Seminole
Tribe. The opinion does not seem to deny that a copyright is "property,"
citing Ruckelshaus and finding that "[b]y analogy, copyrights constitute
intangible property that, for some purposes at least, receives constitutional
protection."246 The court did not, however, proceed to decide the question of
whether the state's conduct effects a confiscatory or regulatory taking.
Instead, it noted that in addition to allegedly infringing the plaintiff s copy-
right, the state also breached its contract with the plaintiff, suggesting errone-
ously that the existence of a breach of contract claim somehow bars the
bringing of the copyright claim.247 Because a breach of contract does not
constitute a violation of due process, according to the court, no constitutional
violation existed and the abrogating statute must be seen as expanding the
substantive rights of copyright owners rather than merely providing a remedy
for a pre-existing constitutional violation. This doomed the statute under the
"logic of City of Boerne," according to the court.248
242. 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
243. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d
1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998),petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1998)
(No. 98-531).
244. Id
245. 139 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 1998).
246. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623, at *5 (5th Cir. Oct. 1,
1998).
247. Id. This claim is especially bizarre given that the state law claim may well be
preempted by federal copyright law. See National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v Computer Assoc.
Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426,428 (8th Cir. 1993).
248. Chavez, 1998 WL 685623, at *5.
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The Chavez court's claim that the occasional existence of a breach of
contract claim against a state dooms the abrogation legislation was not persua-
sive. The existence of a parallel state remedy does not mean that the constitu-
tional violation is somehow nullified. 49 Take for example the Supreme
Court's holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, reaffirmed in Seminole Tribe, that
Congress properly abrogated state sovereign immunity in Title VII sex dis-
crimination cases brought against the states.20 In many cases of sex discrimi-
nation in employment, the state has not only violated the employee's right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the plaintiff's
private contractual rights (for example, the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing) and local antidiscrimination regulations. The existence of
potential state remedies does not render the abrogation legislation blessed in
Fitzpatrick somehow suspect. To the extent that the facts underlying many,
if not most, constitutional violations provide a basis for bringing a state law
cause of action, the Fifth Circuit's position means that Congress can seldom,
if ever, abrogate state sovereign immunity after Seminole Tribe and City of
Boerne. Although some states' rights advocates may prefer such an outcome,
it runs directly contrary to the express holding of Fitzpatrick and Seminole
Tribe itself.
One final argument raised by the Fifth Circuit merits consideration. The
court worried that upholding the plaintiff's claim would allow Congress to
make an end run around Seminole Tribe by declaring something to be "prop-
erty" under its Article I powers and then declaring it protected against state
encroachment under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It asserts that
"Congress could easily legislate 'property' interests and then attempt to sub-
ject states to suit in federal court for the violation of such interests.""1 This
argument, if persuasive, would reduce the significance of Ruckelshaus, given
that the property right protected in that case was created by a state and not by
Congress.
The most powerful response we can offer is that under City of Boerne,
Congress does not have the power to define what constitutes a violation of an
individual's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court made clear that Con-
gress does not have the power to declare something a constitutional violation
and willy-nilly provide a remedy. It is up to the courts to decide whether a
state law or an act of Congress establishes a right that may be characterized
as property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and whether that
right has been unconstitutionally burdened. The Court has frequently denied
249. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1913) (explaining
that existence of constitutional violation does not turn on whether state remedies are available).
250. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
251. Id.at5ll.
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plaintiffs' claims that a law establishes a right that is constitutionally pro-
tected. The fact that sometimes Congress has the power to create something
that looks like property (for example, a copyright or a patent) does not mean
that it has plenary power to declare all interferences with property rights to be
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Does the Subjective Intent of Congress Matter?
The Curious Case of Bankruptcy
Although College Savings Bank and Chavez are the only cases to
squarely address the question of the propriety of Congress's abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent, copyright, and trademark cases,
several federal appellate courts have examined a similar amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act. 2 Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that Con-
gress's abrogation of state Eleventh Amendment immunity in bankruptcy
cases was ineffective. 3 These cases are relevant because, as Justice Stevens
recognized in his dissent in Seminole Tribe, 4 abrogation in the intellectual
property and bankruptcy contexts probably raises similar issues.
At first glance, the bankruptcy decisions in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
may seem odd. After all, much of bankruptcy law is concerned with protect-
ing the property interests of creditors. In situations in which a state has
unconstitutionally taken property from a creditor without paying just compen-
sation or has deprived a creditor of its property without due process of law,
Congress should have the power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to enact legislation to protect the creditor. Imagine a situation in which
a creditor properly perfects a security interest in the debtor's farm equipment
in StateA, butjust before the debtor declares bankruptcy, StateA's tax bureau
seizes the farm equipment pursuant to a subsequently filed tax lien. Under
both state and federal law, the creditor has the superior interest in the prop-
erty. 5 In other words, the state's seizure of the property is wrongful and is
252. See I I U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994) ("Notwithstanding an assertion ofsovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section
with respect to the following [sections]."); id. § 106(a)(3) ("The court may issue against a
governmental unit an order, process, or judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not
including an award of punitive damages.").
253. See generally In re Estate ofFemandez, 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Creative
Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517
(1998).
254. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.2 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that majority decision "suggests that persons harmed by state violations of federal
copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws have no remedy").
255. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (stating that security interest takes priority over
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 849 (1998)
properly characterized as a deprivation of property without due process of
law. 2 6 Under City ofBoerne,.Congress would have the power under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such a creditor with an appropriate
remedy in federal court.
Neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Circuits considered the possibility that
the abrogation of immunity in § 106 of the Bankruptcy Act remedies unconsti-
tutional deprivations of property. Rather, in a bizarre analytical turn, both
courts focused on Congress's subjective intent in passing § 106. Although the
Bankruptcy Reform Act was passed in 1994, in the era before Seminole Tribe
when Congress naturally presumed it could rely on the Commerce Clause or
the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity, 7 the Fourth
Circuit in In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.," seemed
surprised that "there is no evidence to indicate that in enacting the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Congress acted under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. " 9 It found that Congress acted under its Article I powers and
rejected the plaintiff's "reliance on [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a post hoc justification for Congress's attempted abrogation in 11 U.S.C.
§ 106.16 The court refused to "presume that Congress intended to enact a
law under a general Fourteenth Amendment power to remedy an unspecified
violation of rights when a specific, substantive Article I power clearly enabled
the law."z6 1 We note here that Congress referenced section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the legislative history behind the statute abrogating state
sovereign immunity in patent and trademark cases, but not in copyright
cases.
262
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit did not consider the extent to which § 106
might remedy unconstitutional deprivations of property by the states. The
person who becomes lien creditor after interest is perfected). A state, of course, could change
this priority rule. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (stating that trustee may avoid transfers made on
account of antecedent debt owed by debtor during ninety-day period before bankruptcy is filed).
256. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,44 (1960) (finding that materialman's
lien was protected by Takings Clause); cf North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601,606-07 (1975) (finding unconstitutional state law that allowed certain sorts of process-less
seizures).
257. See Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (finding that Congress can
abrogate state sovereign immunity under Commerce Clause), overruled by Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
258. 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
259. In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1146 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Cross, supra note 7, at 544-55 & n.199.
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decision in In re Estate of Fernandez63 is driven by the conclusion that
"[t]here is no evidence that the 1994 Act was passed pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment."2" What neither court realized is that the Supreme Court
has "never require[d] a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute." '265 The validity of a statute does not rise or fall on the existence of a
House or Senate committee report that suggests congressional reliance on a
particular section of the Constitution. Every Supreme Court opinion that has
addressed the subject makes it clear that the constitutionality of a statute
does not depend on whether Congress used the magic words "Fourteenth
Amendment" in the legislative history.267 Recent appellate court cases
agree.
268
The inquiry into the constitutionality of legislation is properly focused
on one question: Does the Constitution authorize the legislation at issue?
McCulloch v. Maryland269 provides the enduring paradigm of how the Court
approached the question of whether Congress has the power to enact a particu-
lar piece of legislation. The focus is on the Constitution and whether its
ratifiers intended Congress to have the power to act. We know of no Supreme
Court case that suggests that an otherwise properly authorized act of Congress
is invalid because Congress invoked an inappropriate section of the Constitu-
tion or none at all.
263. 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997).
264. In re Estate of Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241,245 (5th Cir. 1997).
265. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); see Ramirez v.
Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The omission of any ritualistic
incantation of powers by the Congress is not determinative, for there is no requirement that the
statute incorporate buzz words such as 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'section 5."').
266. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("[T]he constitutional-
ity of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes
to exercise.").
267. In fact, the legislative history does indicate that Congress relied on the Patent Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating state Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent
and trademark cases. See S. REP.No. 102-280, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,3093-94;
see also College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 423 n.23 (D.N.L 1996), aff'd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149).
268. See Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431,436(5th Cir. 1998) ("Seminole Tribe 'requires
us to make an objective inquiry, namely whether Congress could have enacted the legislation
at issue... ." (quoting Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997))); Wheeling &
Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen
determining the sources of Congress's authority to legislate, we may look beyond the expressed
constitutional basis in a statute's preamble or legislative history.").
269. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (finding that Congress has implied Article I power to
establish Bank of the United States).
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Nonetheless, the end result reached by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on
the abrogation issue in the bankruptcy context is probably correct. Although
§ 106 provides a federal forum for some unconstitutional deprivations of
property, as in the hypothetical posed above, it casts its net far too broadly,
making states amenable to federal jurisdiction in a wide variety of contexts in
which a state's behavior is constitutional. Under City ofBoerne, Congress can
only legislate pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
remedy a preexisting violation of the rights secured by section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 7 Although the Court will tolerate a remedy that is
slightly overbroad,"' the opinion in City of Boerne requires a "congruence"
between the unconstitutional wrong targeted by Congress and the means
chosen. The Court therefore held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
was unconstitutional because most of the conduct it prohibited was constitu-
tional. 2
Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1994 is similarly defec-
tive. One can imagine numerous scenarios in which § 106 forces states that
have not committed any violations of the Fourteenth Amendment into federal
court. For example, § 106 expressly abrogates state sovereign immunity as to
11 U.S.C. § 362, which provides for an automatic stay against creditors of the
debtor at the moment the debtor files his bankruptcy petition. Case law holds
that sending a letter to the debtor demanding payment constitutes a violation
of the stay.273 Therefore, under § § 106 and 362, a state agency that sends such
a letter to the debtor could theoretically be dragged into federal court, al-
though it is clear that such letter writing is not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Consider a further illustration. In In re Creative Goldsmiths, the trustee
in bankruptcy sought to recover a payment of $43 82 in income taxes paid to
the Maryland Comptroller of Currency during the ninety-day preference
period before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.274 Again, this scenario does not
present unconstitutional behavior on the part of the State of Maryland; all
Maryland did was accept money that it was legally owed. We cannot find a
decision suggesting that a state's failure to return money rightfully owed to it
constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although § 106 may
sometimes afford a remedy for an unconstitutional deprivation of property by
270. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
271. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1997) (noting that ban on
literacy tests by Voting Rights Act prohibited some constitutional uses of tests, but evidence
showed primary use of tests was discriminatory).
272. Id. at2171-72.
273. See In re Nelson, 123 B.R. 993, 1000 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1991).
274. In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998).
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a state, most of the time a state would find itself subject to federal jurisdiction
without having committed a constitutional wrong.
In the final analysis, the fit between means and end in § 106 is unconsti-
tutionally disproportionate under City ofBoerne. We have already suggested
that the congruence between remedy and wrong in the context of the abroga-
tions of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal patent, copyright, trade-
mark law is constitutionally snug. 5 The vast majority of state infringements
of federal intellectual property constitute violations of the Takings Clause.
And that is what matters - not the existence of the proper invocation of
section 5 in the respective legislative histories.
F. Can State Immunity Be Avoided by Suing in State Court?
Suppose we are wrong in concluding that the intellectual property abro-
gating legislation is a valid exercise of section 5 power. Does it follow that
plaintiffs must resort to a state law cause of action for inverse condemnation,
as discussed in Part I, or can plaintiffs avoid the Eleventh Amendment by
bringing suits under the patent, copyright, and trademark statutes in state
court?276 The issue is worthy of attention not only because of its relevance to
the intellectual property context, but also because Congress has purported to
abrogate immunity in a range of contexts, and the section 5 argument we have
advanced may not work in some of them.277 Professor Daniel J. Meltzer
points out that Congress has recently passed numerous statutes that impose
liability for retrospective relief on the states, listing "copyright, trademark, and
patent laws; the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; the Fair Labor
Standards Act; the bankruptcy laws; the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act;
and provisions barring discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age, and
disability.
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We believe the Supreme Court will hold that a state does have an obliga-
tion to open its courts to suits brought by individuals seeking to enforce
federal laws against that state.279 To begin with, there is recent precedent
275. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
276. For the sake of exploring this issue, we put aside 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which provides
for exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent and copyright cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
If an otherwise compelling case could be made in favor of giving effect to the recent abrogating
legislation by allowing state court suits, then an equally compelling argument may be advanced
in favor of reading the abrogating legislation as carving out an implicit exception to exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
277. See College Say. Bankv. FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Educ. ExpenseBd., 131 F.3d
353, 361-62 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that Congress may not abrogate Eleventh Amendment in
false advertising cases when state makes false statement about one of its own products),petition
for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149).
278. Meltzer, supra note 160, at 47-48.
279. Others holding this position include Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justicia-
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favoring access to state courts. The clearest example is found in Hilton v.
South Carolina Public Railways Commission.28 In Hilton, an injured em-
ployee of a state-owned railroad brought suit against South Carolina under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) in federal court.28' While his
damages action was pending, the Court rendered its decision in Welch v.
Texas Department offHighways andPublic Transportation,282 which held that
the Jones Act did not properly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.283 Because the Jones Act, which provides remedies for injured
seamen, and FELA, which provides remedies for injured railway workers,
establish parallel statutory schemes, Hilton logically assumed that the Elev-
enth Amendment doomed his federal court suit, had it voluntarily dismissed,
and refiled his FELA claim in South Carolina state court.284
In its own courts, South Carolina successfully resisted Hilton's refiled
claim, arguing that FELA did not authorize an action for money damages
against an unconsenting state.28 Reversing the South Carolina courts, the
Supreme Court emphatically rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amend-
ment provided South Carolina with immunity from suit in its own courts,
noting "as we have stated on many occasions, 'the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply in state courts."'286 Although the Eleventh Amendment barred Hil-
ton's suit in federal court, Congress retained the power to provide a remedy
in state court for the violation of a federal right. The Court stated that when
"a federal statute does impose liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause
makes that statute the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court." '287
Nor does Hilton stand alone. Nevada v. Hall288 held that when a state is
sued in the courts of another state, the forum court is not constitutionally
compelled to respect the state's assertion of substantive immunity.289 In order
bility of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NoTREDAMEL. REv. 1145, 1171-77 (1984); Vicki
C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1, 38 nn.157-58, 74 n.304, 99 n.394 (1988); Meltzer, supra note 160, at 58; Louis
E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: DamagesAgainst States in Their
Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. RsV. 189, 198 (1981).
280. 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
281. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 199 (1991).
282. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
283. Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476 (1987).
284. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199-200.
285. Id. at 200-01.
286. Id. at 204-05 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1989)).
287. Id. at 207.
288. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
289. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1979).
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to uphold state immunity against a federal cause of action in the state's own
courts, the Court would need either to abandon Hall or else explain why it
should matter whether suit is brought in one state court rather than another.
An advocate of broad immunity" may argue that, by according state
immunity a constitutional pedigree, Seminole Tribe undercuts the authority of
Hilton and Hall. If state immunity is of constitutional dimension, then a mere
statute may be ineffective to annul it. But Seminole Tribe itself never men-
tions Hilton and Hall, much less overrules them. The opinion addresses only
the states' immunity from federal suit, and the Court held only that immunity
from federal suit has constitutional status. Seminole Tribe contains only a
passing reference, buried in a footnote, to state court suits. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had dissented in Hall, observed that "this
Court is empowered to review a question of federal law arising from a state-
court decision where a State has consented to suit."29' The negative implica-
tion of this truism may be that the Court would recognize a state's assertion
of immunity in its own courts from suits to enforce federal laws. On the other
hand, neither Hans v. Louisiana nor Seminole Tribe involved suits brought in
state court, and the dicta hardly squares with cases in which, for example, a
tax refund was required of a recalcitrant state.292
While Seminole Tribe's dictum may unsettle the authority of Hilton and
Hall, we doubt, for a variety of reasons, that the Court is ready to overrule the
earlier cases. In the first place, a strong pragmatic argument can be advanced
in favor of requiring state courts to hear such suits. In the absence of access
to state court for suits brought by individuals against state governments, the
enforcement mechanisms of these laws would be extremely limited. The
United States could bring an enforcement action, of course, as the states'
immunity is unavailable in such a suit.293 So far as individual plaintiffs are
concerned, the primary enforcement mechanism would be suits against
individual government officials in their personal capacities. This approach
would have numerous defects:
The responsible officials may be hard to identify, have left the jurisdiction,
or be judgment-proof. When the scope of substantive duties is uncertain,
personal liability may impair effective government decision making and
unfairly penalize individuals ....
... [I]n today's world of high litigation costs, massively complex
federal requirements, and erratic but sometimes punishing jury verdicts,
290. See generally Vlzquez, supra note 16.
291. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (emphasis added).
292. See generally, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994); McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Bev. and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
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such an approach seems neither very practical, politically feasible, nor
likely to contribute to harmonious federalism.294
In situations in which Congress may constitutionally regulate state activity,
limiting the vehicles for enforcement in this way looks unwieldy, if not
perverse.
The case for access to state court does not rest solely upon practical
considerations. A powerful argument based on constitutional structure also
favors less-than-absolute immunity. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law
trumps state law; therefore, any state law standing in the way of the full
enforcement of the federal mandate should be preempted.295 Although the
Eleventh Amendment carves out ajurisdictional exception to this principle,
imposing a requirement on state courts to hear these suits affirms the substan-
tive supremacy of federal law. Indeed, Congress recognizes the possible dual
nature of state immunity when it makes states substantively liable in one part
of a statute while abrogating their immunity from suit in federal court in
another separate part.296 The point of this distinction between federal legisla-
tive and federal judicial power is that the states are well-equipped to defend
their interests in Congress, whose members are elected from the states and
who are politically accountable to their electorates. 297 By contrast, there are
no similar structural restraints on Article IIIjudges. Accordingly, it is appro-
priate to curb federal judicial power, as the Court did in Seminole Tribe, while
recognizing broad Congressional power to subject states to suit in their own
courts .
2 9 8
This view is grounded in both logic and precedent. We note that in
recent cases the Court has consistently resorted to the Tenth Amendment and
principles of federalism to adjudicate complaints that Congress cannot force
the states to comply with federal law. The Court has not yet used the Eleventh
Amendment as its vehicle for crafting rules of substantive immunity. For
example, after discussing Congress's power to force states to comply with
federal overtime and minimum wage legislation in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,299 the Court held that state and local govern-
294. Meltzer, supra note 160, at 48.
295. Id. at 57.
296. Id.
297. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954).
298. Cf Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation ofPowers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARV.L.REV.
682,712-13 (1976) (arguing, more ambitiously than we do here, for broad Congressional power
to subject states to suit in federal court).
299. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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ments cannot constitutionally avoid compliance with federal law: Congress
can force the states against their will to comply with federal law. °0 This
holding has been recently amplified in New York v. United States,0 1 which
held that Congress can apply laws of general applicability againstthe states. 02
Congress may not single out and "commandeer" a state legislature or its
executive branch, but it may treat a state just like it treats other actors in the
market. Granted, the Court may have assumed that suits against government
officials in their personal capacity were the only vehicle to obtain retrospec-
tive relief, but we have already noted how unsatisfactory such a regime would
be. More importantly, there is no hint in these cases that the states could in
any way avoid enforcement of valid laws against them as official entities.
Another relevant line of cases, culminating in Printz v. United States,3 3
held that Congress can force state courts to hear claims based on the violation
of federal rights. In Printz, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court noted that
Article Il of the Constitution establishes a Supreme Court, but leaves the
creation of lower federal courts to the discretion of Congress.3" The logical
conclusion is that "the Constitution was originally understood to permit
imposition of an obligation on statejudges to enforce federal prescriptions.""3 5
It is beyond doubt that a state normally must stand willing to adjudicate
federal statutory and constitutional claims brought in its courts." 6
Also noteworthy are the cases in which state courts refused to entertain
suits brought to enforce a federal law. The Court has permitted such refusal
for neutral reasons, like the inconvenience of the forum.0 7 Yet the Court has
consistently reversed state court refusals to adjudicate federal claims in cases
in which the state court's reasons amount to an assertion that there is a con-
300. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554-57 (1985).
301. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
302. NewYorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (concluding that Congress may
not force state to make Hobson's choice between building radioactive waste dump or taking
legal title to all low-level radioactive waste within its borders).
303. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (finding that Congress may not force unwilling local sheriffs
to conduct background checks on gun purchasers).
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
305. Printz, 117 S. Ct at2371; see id. at2370 n.1 ("[A] state court must entertain a claim
arising under federal law 'when its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local law is appropri-
ate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws."' (quoting Second Employers'
Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1912))).
306. We do not rely heavily on this line of cases, however, as these cases do not expressly
discuss suits brought against state governments.
307. See generally, e.g., Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S.
377 (1929).
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flict between federal law and state policy. Relying on the Supremacy Clause,
the Court has declared that "the policy of... federal [law] is the prevailing
policy in every state."3 '
We predict that the Court, consistent with all these threads of doctrine,
will hold that when a claimant seeks to enforce a generally applicable federal
law against a state, it may do so in state court. We believe that as long as the
federal law is substantively valid under Garcia and New York, a state court
should have to entertain an action to enforce it. The Court seems to have
established a clear division of labor - the Tenth Amendment governs issues
of substantive immunity and the Eleventh Amendment governs issues of
jurisdictional immunity.
III Suing Officers and Municipalities Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The patent, copyright, and trademark laws all impose liability on any
person who commits an act of infringement or false advertising.3 9 Govern-
ment officials and local governments who commit violations of the federal
copyright, patent, and trademark statutes may be sued like anyone else,
although the official immunity doctrine discussed below"'0 sometimes shields
officials from liability for damages in circumstances in which other defen-
dants would be obliged to pay.
Intellectual property rights created by state law, such as trade secrets and
publicity rights, fall outside the terms of the copyright, patent, and trademark
laws. There is, however, another avenue by which these interests, as well as
violations of copyright, patent, and trademark rights, may be redressed. We
have in mind situations in which the interference is serious enough to amount
to a "deprivation" of the property in violation of the substantive component
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' For example, an
official who negligently divulges a trade secret could not be held liable
because a greater degree of culpability is required to make out a substantive
308. Testav. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,393 (1947). See generally Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356
(1990); Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
309. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) (stating that any person who commits trademark
infringement or false advertising shall be liable); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (stating that"[a]nyone
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner" shall be liable); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (Supp. 11 1996) (stating that "whoever without authority makes... any patented
invention" shall be liable).
310. See infra text accompanying notes 311-13.
311. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (distinguishing between proce-
dural and substantive due process). If the claim is that the government may procure the
property, but has not followed proper procedures, then the case may be conceived either as a
taking or as a violation of procedural due process, and the plaintiff may well be required to
bring an inverse condemnation suit in state court.
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due process violation." 2 On the other hand, cases from the land use context
suggest that when an official deliberately appropriates intellectual property,
knowing he is violating the owner's rights, a substantive due process theory
should be successful.
313
Assuming the elements of substantive due process can be proven, the
victim may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes damages or injunc-
tive relief against "every person who, under color of [state law]," violates
someone's constitutional rights.314 The advantage of bringing a § 1983 suit,
even in fact patterns that may also be framed as patent, copyright, and trade-
mark cases, 315 is that a successful plaintiff in such a suit is ordinarily entitled
to attorney's fees. 6 Such suits are almost never available against federal
officers, as they do not usually act under color of state law.
A. Lawsuits Against Officials
For purposes of § 1983, "every person" includes both government offi-
cials and local governments, but not the state itself.317 As we shall see, the
requirements for success differ depending on whether the (real) defendant is
an officer or a government. Below are some important issues that arise in
312. See generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986).
313. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1549
(1 th Cir.), vacateden banc, 42 F.3d 626 (1 th Cir. 1994) ("Deprivation of a property interest
rises to the level of a substantive due process violation if done for improper motives and
achieved through means that are arbitrary and capricious, and lacking any rational basis.");
Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City ofPhila., 5 F.3d 685,692 (3d Cir. 1993) ("A violation of substan-
tive due process rights is proven: (1) if the government's actions were not rationally related to
a legitimate government interest; or (2) if the government's actions in a particular case were in
fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive.").
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
315. The plaintiff may choose to pursue both remedies in the same complaint, of course.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994). See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTIoN 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 570-72 (2d ed. 1994). On the other
hand, there are no trebled or "statutory" damages, as in the patent and copyright statutes. The
plaintiff must prove harm in order to receive compensatory damages. See generally Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
Punitive damages are available only for egregious misconduct by an official, Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30 (1983), and are not available against local governments, City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). See Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional
Torts, 56 LA. L. REv. 841, 864-72 (1996) (arguing that punitive damages should be more
readily available in § 1983 cases as means of deterring official misconduct).
317. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979) (noting lack of clear statement
abrogating state immunity in § 1983). For similar reasons, the Court later held that one may not
sue the state under § 1983 in state court either. See generally Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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suits against officers, and that may be of particular importance in suits involv-
ing intellectual property.
1. "Official" Capacity and "Individual" Capacity Lawsuits
Although state and local governments are treated differently for purposes
of sovereign immunity law, state and local government officials are all subject
to the same rules, with one exception - when they are sued under § 1983. The
exception comes up when the plaintiff sues an officer in her "official" capac-
ity. In that event, the officer is treated, for most purposes, like the government
for whom she works.3" 8 An employee of the state government and its instru-
mentalities sued in her official capacity would be entitled to assert the state's
sovereign immunity against a suit for damages, just as though the state had
been named as the defendant. An employee of local government, sued in her
official capacity, would have no sovereign immunity shield, simply because
local governments have none. Notice, however, a confusing wrinkle in the
law: When a state official is sued in her official capacity, it remains possible
to obtain prospective relief against the official, even though such a suit would
fail on Eleventh Amendment grounds in the event that the state were the
named defendant." 9 In fact, the customary practice is to sue the official in her
official capacity, so that the injunction may continue in force when the holder
of the office is replaced.32°
When the plaintiff wishes to recover retrospective relief from an officer
of state or local government, he should sue the officer in her individual
capacity. This is so even though the suit charges that the officer committed
a constitutional violation in the course of her official duties. The distinction
between "official" and "individual" capacity suits has nothing to do with the
public or private nature of the activity.321 It relates only to the real party in
interest: A suit against an officer in her "official" capacity is a suit against the
governmental employer, subject to the rules that would apply in a suit naming
the governmental employer (except for the prospective relief wrinkle noted
above). It is up to the plaintiff to decide how to characterize the claim. For
that matter, the plaintiff may choose to sue officers in both their "individual"
and "official" capacities.
318. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("[A] plaintiff seeking to re-
cover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity
itself.").
319. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 ("[O]fficial-capacity actions for prospective relief
are not treated as actions against the State." (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14)).
320. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1125 & nn. 1-2.
321. See generallyHaferv. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
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2. "Under Color Of" State Law
Officers may be sued only for constitutional violations committed "under
color of" state law. "Under color of" does not mean "authorized" by state
law."2 It simply means that the officer acted under pretense of state law,
using her state authority in some way, even if the action is illegal. The inquiry
is highly fact-specific. A professor at a state school who infringes protected
materials in her courses would act under color of state law even if state law
forbids the practice. A professor who buys a book at the local bookstore and
makes infringing copies for a private project unrelated to her job very likely
does not act under color of state law, although the result may be different if
she obtained the book from the school library in the course of her official
duties.
3. Injunctive Relief
Despite the Eleventh Amendment, the Court held in Exparte Young that
the victim of a continuing constitutional or federal statutory violation can
obtain an injunction directed at the official responsible'for the violation.3"
For example, ifa university biochemistry department were routinely violating
a patent owner's federal rights, an injunction against the responsible infring-
ing employees constitutionally could be issued. If the Court were to hold,
contrary to our analysis, that Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is unconstitutional, Ex parte Young stands as at least a partial
remedy for frustrated owners of federal intellectual property.
4. Official Immunity
When government officers perform legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial
functions, they are absolutely immune from paying damages. Legislators
alone are immune from prospective relief. We suspect these absolute immuni-
ties will have little practical importance for the protection of intellectual
property rights, as most interferences with intellectual property will arise from
the officers' exercise of executive functions of government. Everyone from
policemen to the heads of government departments to the mayor and the
governor acts in an executive capacity. These officers are always subject to
suit for prospective relief but receive a "qualified" immunity from suits for
damages. They "generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
322. Monroev. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961), overruled on other grounds byMonell
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
323. See generally Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (involving injunction against
state attorney general to prevent enforcement of unconstitutional rate-setting scheme).
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rights of which a reasonable person would have known."324 Notice that this
qualified immunity would be available in a suit under the Copyright Act as
well as in a § 1983 suit charging a constitutional violation of property rights.
One can imagine a wide variety of circumstances in which a government
employee might find qualified immunity to be a powerful shield. For exam-
ple, a very persuasive fair use3" argument can be offered on behalf of teachers
who photocopy otherwise protected materials for distribution to their students
in the form of"coursepacks. '326 Although one appellate court has found a for-
profit copyshop liable for photocopying infringing coursepacks," 7 no court
has ever found a teacher liable in a coursepack case. A teacher with a knowl-
edge of the Copyright Act and the relevant case law could reasonably con-
clude that distributing a photocopied coursepack is not a violation of federal
copyright law. Therefore, the teacher could successfully assert qualified
immunity from an infringement suit brought by the copyright owner.328
We note that the pocketbook of a state employee who is found liable is
typically protected by some sort of insurance plan or indemnification scheme.
An employee's source of indemnification for an illegal act, whether through
insurance or a contractual right to be reimbursed by the state itself, does not,
however, cause the state's immunity to rub off on the employee because such
private arrangements do not confer upon a successful plaintiff the right to
enforce the judgment against the state.329
B. Lawsuits Against Local Governments
Municipalities (and municipal officials sued, confusingly, in their "offi-
cial capacities") cannot assert either the state's sovereign immunity3 30 or
324. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
325. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (stating that fair use of copyright is not infringement).
326. See id. (stating that fair use includes making of"multiple copies for classroom use");
see also Amy E. Groves, Recent Development, Princeton University Press v. Michigan Docu-
ment Services, Inc.: The Sixth Circuit Frustrates the ConstitutionalPurposes of Copyright and
Fair Use Doctrine, 31 GA. L. REV. 325,328 (1996) (arguing that commercial copyshop should
have been afforded fair use defense in preparing professors' coursepacks).
327. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383
(6th Cir. 1996).
328. But see Better Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 904 F. Supp. 540, 553 (S.D. W. Va.
1995) (finding that state attorney general was not entitled to qualified immunity when unlawful-
ness of his incorporation of state agency with name similar to plaintiffs "should have been
apparent to him" in light of existing law), afPd sub nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 689 (1998).
329. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.5.2, at 394-95 & n.22 (2d ed.
1994) (discussing lawsuits against state officers and indemnification).
330. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890); see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 133, at 1056-57.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYMISAPPROPRIATION
official immunity.33 In order to recover, the plaintiff must, however, meet
another requirement. According to the Supreme Court's ruling in Monell v.
Department of Social Services,332 a municipality is not liable under § 1983
unless the constitutional injury is inflicted during the "execution of a govern-
ment's policy or custom." '333 Governments always act through their officers.
The point of the requirement is that local governments are not liable on a
respondeat superior basis for anything their officers do in the course of their
official duties. Local governments are responsible only for those acts that fall
within the category of "policy or custom." '334
The cases on "policy or custom" can be divided into four fact patterns.
First, a city or county335 will be liable for implementing rules of general
application enacted by the city council or an agency. The city would almost
surely be liable, for example, if the board of education made a decision that
teachers should photo copy textbooks and sell them to students, rather than buy
the books. Second, the city may be liable for a "custom" involving high
officials who are aware of a widespread practice and do nothing to stop it,
although there is no written policy requiring or approving the practice.336
Such a situation may arise if, to alter our hypothetical, infringing copyrights
is common practice in the local schools, the superintendent and the school
board know about it, and no one takes effective steps to stop it. Third, a
government may be liable for unconstitutional acts committed by its employ-
ees if the injuries are caused by "inadequate training," '3 or, perhaps, "inade-
quate hiring" by recklessly hiring a dangerous employee.338 Although the
typical cases arise in the context of physical injuries inflicted by police
officers and jailers, it may be possible to construct a lawsuit against a city for
failure to train its employees how to deal appropriately with intellectual
property as well.
331. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1980).
332. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
333. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ("[I]t is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.").
334. Id.
335. For purposes of the rule discussed in this section, cities and counties are equivalent.
336. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 329, § 8.5.2, at 453-54 (discussing establishment of
municipal liability through demonstrating existence of "custom").
337. See generally, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
338. The Court found that the evidence failed to justify the application of such a theory,
but did not wholly reject the theory itself, in the recent case Board of the County Comm'rs v.
Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388-94 (1997).
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A fourth principle is less well-defined. Supreme Court cases hold that a
city may be liable in the absence of a widespread policy or custom if the
official who acts is the city's "policymaker" in a given domain.339 If so, then
his action in that domain will be attributed to the city. In Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati,340 for example, the local prosecutor told deputies to enter a room
without a warrant.34' The Court held that the prosecutor was the county's
policymaker as to police searches, so that the county could be liable for his
action.342 For the sake of illustrating the limits of this principle, it is instructive
to compare Pembaur with City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,343 in which the
plaintiffwas fired by a mid-level city bureaucrat, allegedly for constitutionally
impermissible reasons.3" Because the firing was subject to review at a higher
level, and there was no indication of unconstitutional motives on the part of the
reviewers, the Court held that the former employee could not sue the city.345
The Court's most recent foray into this area is a 1997 case, McMillian v.
Monroe County,346 in which it stressed the role of state law in determining
who is a "policymaker" for the purpose of the "single act" principle. 7
Although state law could not answer the question, the Court stated that the
"inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law," in the sense thatthe Court's
"understanding of the actual function of a governmental official ... will
necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official's functions under
relevant state law."34 The application of the "single act by a policymaker"
principle to intellectual property cases, then, is likely to vary depending on the
actor, and may vary from one state to another depending on state law. Perhaps
the "policy or custom" test of Monell would be satisfied if a powerful mayor
or city manager ordered all municipal secretaries to make unauthorized copies
of a new word processing program.
1V. Conflicts Between Federal and State Jurisdiction
Remedies for governmental intrusions on intellectual property are avail-
able under federal statutory and constitutional law, as well as under state
339. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
340. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
341. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1986).
342. Id. at 485.
343. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
344. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 116 (1988).
345. Id. at 127.
346. 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
347. McMillian v. Monroe County, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 1736 (1997) (holding that under
Alabama law, county sheriff is state, not county, policymaker).
348. Id. at 1737.
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condemnation law. Either the government or the property holder may be the
plaintiff. Suit may be brought in either federal or state court. This complex
remedial landscape gives rise to problems ofjurisdictional coordination: May
the property owner sue in federal court under § 1983 or under the intellectual
property statutes even ifa state remedy for inverse condemnation is available?
The answer to the forum issue may vary depending on whether the
federal suit is brought under § 1983 or the intellectual property statutes. In
any case, keep in mind that this is not merely a dry procedural issue. The
remedies may differ depending on the forum, and the differences between
federal and state judges may even produce systematically different outcomes
on the merits of close cases. Accordingly, an overarching policy issue here
should be noted: In addition to the specific considerations identified in the
ensuing paragraphs, one's view of the choice between federal and state courts
will be influenced, in part, on ajudgment as to whether the property owner or
the defendant government or officer ought to get the benefit of any litigating
edge that comes with having the case adjudicated in a forum that will likely
be sympathetic to his interests.
A. Section 1983 Litigation
It is useful to distinguish between § 1983 suits against governments and
those brought against individual officers. We begin with suits against govern-
ments. Recall that these suits are possible only when the challenged action
meets the "policy or custom" test of Monell."9
1. Lawsuits Against Governments
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,35 Hamilton Bank charged that the Planning Commission had taken its
property by unconstitutionally interfering with its efforts to develop land and
sued the Planning Commission in federal court under § 1983 to recover the
value of the land.35' The Court rejected the bank's Just Compensation Clause
theory of recovery for lack of ripeness, citing two reasons. First, a regulatory
taking claim "is not ripe until the government entity charged with implement-
ing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of
the regulations to the property at issue."35 Here, the plaintiff had not sought
variances that would have allowed it to develop the property according to its
349. See supra text accompanying note 333.
350. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
351. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 182
(1985).
352. Id. at 186.
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proposed plat."'3 Second, "a property owner has not suffered a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for
obtaining such compensation." '354 The bank went wrong by attempting to sue
in federal court under § 1983 rather than bringing an inverse condemnation
action under state law in state court. 55
The Court went on to consider the viability of the case when conceived
as a claim that the Planning Commission had deprived the bank of its property
without due process of law. This theory, too, was "premature." '356 Viewed in
this way, the case would depend on whether the regulation was "so onerous
that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property."357 That inquiry
would turn largely "upon an analysis of the effect the Commission's applica-
tion of the zoning ordinance.., had on the value of [the bank's] property and
investment-backed profit expectations."358 As with the takings claim, that
effect could not be measured until the bank applied for variances.359
Does Williamson County require persons claiming violations of intellec-
tual property rights to bring inverse condemnation actions in state court before
seeking federal relief under § 1983? If the plaintiff frames the § 1983 case as
a violation of the Takings Clause, the second prong of the Court's response
to the Williamson County plaintiff's takings theory seems equally applicable
here. Evidently, any takings claim is premature until the state has failed to
adequately compensate,360 and one must always pursue the state court inverse
condemnation action as a means of obtaining compensation.
Suppose the plaintiff frames the case as a deprivation of property without
due process of law.36' Williamson County may not require deference to state
353. Id. at 188.
354. Id. at 195.
355. Id. at 195-96.
356. Id. at 199.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 200.
359. Id.
360. Cf Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) ("[T]aking claims against the Federal
Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided
by the Tucker Act." (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985))).
361. The difference between the two claims is not just procedural. In the "regulatory"
context, the plaintiff is hard-pressed to win a "takings" claim because he must show that he has
lost all beneficial use of the property. See supra text accompanying note 98; see also First
English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 329 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In principle, a due process claim should be successful if the plaintiff can show a
deprivation of some of his bundle of property rights, even if he is left with some use of the
property.
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inverse condemnation law in such a case. 62 The Court found this claim to be
premature solely because of the bank's failure to apply for variances, a
rationale that is applicable only to regulatory takings like the one at issue.
The rationale is out of place in the context of most violations of intellectual
property rights, which are more like possessory takings.363 Note that the Court
refused to put the due process claim in the same hopper with the takings
claim. In contrast to its treatment of the takings claim, it did not go on to
require the plaintiff to resort to state courts as a prerequisite to asserting the
due process claim in federal court.
This is hardly the sole plausible reading of how Williamson County
applies to intellectual property cases. The materials are at hand to support an
argument that the intellectual property plaintiff must proceed in state court,
even if he frames his federal case as a violation of due process. In ruling that
the takings issue was not ripe, the Court actually relied on two due process
cases, Parratt v. Taylor" and Hudson v. Palmer.365 In Hudson, the Court
held that in the event of a "random and unauthorized" deprivation of property
by an officer, the violation of the Due Process Clause is not complete "unless
or until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the
property loss." '366 If this rationale prevails in the event of "random and unau-
thorized" deprivations for which relief is sought under a due process theory,
and if it prevails in the event of a deliberate deprivation for which relief is
sought under a takings theory, then it may well prevail in the event of a
deliberate deprivation for which relief is sought under a due process theory.367
In Zinermon v. Burch,36 the Supreme Court limited the Parratt principle
to the context ofprocedural due process. 69 That is, the rule that the constitu-
In the possessory takings context, however, the difference between the two theories seems
more a matter of forum and remedy than the overt content of the right.
362. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1547
(1 1th Cir. 1994) ("A property owner's [due process] rights are violated the moment a govern-
mental body acts in an arbitrary manner and applies that arbitrary action to the owner's
property."), vacated en bane, 42 F.3d 626 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 105-11.
364. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
365. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
366. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984).
367. Some lower courts hold that, in the regulatory context, the due process claim
collapses into the takings claim, which, in turn, is covered by the Williamson County takings
rule. A recent example is Villas ofLake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610 (1 th Cir.
1997). It is not clear why the court limited its ruling to the regulatory context. See id. at 613.
The reason may be that it thought possessory takings present a more serious threat to property
rights. See id. at614.
368. 494U.S. 113 (1990).
369. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-30 (1990).
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tional violation is not complete applies only when the plaintiff concedes that
the government may deprive him of liberty or property, but objects to the lack
of procedural protections accompanying the deprivation. By contrast, the
obligation to pursue state remedies does not apply when the plaintiff brings
or raises a "substantive" due process objection to the government's action,
claiming that, regardless of the procedure followed, the government may not
inflict the injury of which he complains. 7 But confining Parratt in this way
presents no serious obstacle to the extension of the Williamson County rule,
because governments are always allowed to take property for public use, so
long as they pay just compensation. Framing a taking as a due process viola-
tion cannot conceal the nature of what the government actually has done, and
what it has the power to do. There may be "substantive" due process limits
on what the government can do,37' but they do not include curbs on taking
property for public use.
Nor does the application of the Parratt and Hudson doctrine to "random
and unauthorized" acts serve to foreclose a rule requiring resort to state courts.
The Court in Williamson County relied on Parratt and Hudson for the propo-
sition that certain circumstances may warrant a requirement ofpostdeprivation
resort to state procedures. One such circumstance is the "random and unau-
thorized" nature of the deprivation, for then "it would be impossible or im-
practicable to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation."372
Another circumstance, the Court reasoned, is the nature of the right granted
by the Takings Clause, which is merely just compensation before or after the
taking.373 Again, framing the claim as procedural due process does not change
the nature of the right at stake. The reality that the state is entitled to procure
the property and pay for it afterward may well be a sufficient justification for
obliging the plaintiff to pursue the inverse condemnation claim, whether the
plaintiff has styled the federal case as a taking or as a violation of due process.
2. Lawsuits Against Officers
Now consider cases in which an officer deprives someone of intellectual
property rights in circumstances that would not support a "policy or custom"
370. See id. at 125. For further discussion of the difference between procedural and
substantive due process, see Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and
the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201, 215-21 (1984).
371. For arguments thatthere are such substantive due process limits, see generally Michael
Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 617 (1997); David H. Armistead, Note, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public
Officials'Power to Terminate State-Created Property Interests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769 (1995).
372. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195
(1985).
373. Id. at 195-96.
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suit against the local government. 74 In that event, the Takings Clause seems
to be inapplicable. The clause not only recognizes an individual's right to just
compensation, it also authorizes the government to assume control of private
property. The premise of the Takings Clause is that the sovereign may,
deliberately or otherwise, take private property for public use.375 That power
is not granted to officers acting under pretense of state authority but without
genuine authorization from the government. When an officer injures property
rights without the backing of his governmental employer, he may be sued for
a violation of rights "under color of" state law,376 yet the special rules that
arguably channel takings and due process suits against local governments into
state court would not apply.
B. Lawsuits Under the Intellectual Property Statutes
The foregoing analysis of the availability of § 1983 suits may apply
equally here. For that matter, the Supreme Court may broaden the Williamson
County holding into a rule that all possessory takings claims, including
intellectual property claims, must be pursued in state court inverse condemna-
tion suits before the property owner brings a § 1983 action. Still, some
considerations are distinctive to the context of litigation under the intellectual
property statutes. Whatever may be true of § 1983 litigation, there are argu-
ments in favor of allowing suits under the intellectual property statutes to go
forward in federal court.
First, § 133 8's exclusive federal jurisdiction over -patent and copyright
manifests a strong congressional preference for federal court adjudication of
these intellectual property claims. More importantly, the abrogating legisla-
tion, which broadly protects intellectual property rights against state inva-
sions, unambiguously demonstrates that Congress wanted plaintiffs to have
access to federal court in such cases.3" Assume that courts appropriately
apply the ripeness rule of Williamson County to § 1983 cases for deprivations
374. The discussion here is not limited to officers of local governments. An officer who
works for an "arm of the state" may also trample on intellectual property rights without the
authority of the state to back him up. The ensuing discussion is, of course, applicable to § 1983
suits against such an officer.
For that matter, there are circumstances in which private persons act "under color of' state
law and hence may be sued under § 1983, such as when they conspire with state officers to
violate the victim's constitutional rights. See generally, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24
(1980).
375. SeeNICHOLsONEMINENTDOMArN § 1.11 (Julius L. Sackman & Russell D. Van Brunt
eds., 3d ed. 1950). See, e.g., First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 314-16 (1987).
376. See supra text accompanying note 322.
377. See supra notes 1-3.
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of property without due process. In such cases, a deference rule may be
appropriate, because there is no specific congressional intent to the contrary.
In the context of the intellectual property statutes, however, the ripeness rule
may be inapplicable, because the claim is for infringement, not for a taking or
a deprivation of property without due process. In a statutory action for
infringement, the availability of a state remedy may simply be irrelevant.
Williamson County'sjudge-made ripeness rule channelling cases to state court
would have to fall before the authority of Congress to allocate jurisdiction,
unless of course it is a rule of constitutional dimension. As to this issue of the
pedigree of the ripeness requirement, Williamson County offers no guid-
ance.
378
C. Must the Federal Court Defer to State Proceedings?
Suppose we are right in asserting that some federal suits for deprivation
of intellectual property may be maintained in spite of the potential obstacles
presented by Williamson County. A further forum allocation issue must be
examined. Recall that the government remains free to institute a condemna-
tion action in its own courts. Accordingly, two lawsuits raising the same
issues may unfold at the same time in the federal and state courts. For exam-
ple, in response to a business filing an action for trademark infringement
against a state in federal court, a state might institute the proper state proceed-
ings to pay restitution for a temporary deprivation of the business property.
Should the federal court defer to the state court?
The Supreme Court did sometimes require federal courts to defer to
pending state litigation. In particular, Younger v. Harris379 and its progeny
direct federal courts to dismiss cases brought by persons who are defendants
in pending state civil and criminal enforcement proceedings against them, if
their federal claims could be raised in the state courts.380 The application of
the Younger rule to the sort of conflict we have posed in this section is un-
clear, because our problem contains elements that point in both directions. On
the one hand, the federal plaintiff is, as in the Younger paradigm, a state court
defendant who could raise his federal claims in state court. On the other hand,
the Court held, in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council ofNew Orleans
378. One commentator maintains that the ripeness doctrine should never have a constitu-
tional pedigree so that doctrines foreclosing federal jurisdiction due to lack of ripeness are
always subject to Congressional revision. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1987).
379. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
380. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,43-46,50 (1971); see HART& WECHSLER, supra note
133, at 1256-1308. Note that a state case is "pending" if it is filed before the federal case, or
after the federal case begins but before there have been "proceedings ofsubstance on the merits"
in federal court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
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(NOPS),38 that the Younger rule requires deference not to all state proceed-
ings, but only to state enforcement proceedings against a private defendant
who has violated state law."2 Younger was inapplicable in NOPSI because,
although there were two state proceedings pending, neither involved enforce-
ment of state law against a recalcitrant defendant. One of the state proceed-
ings was a petition for review of the rate order, brought by the utility com-
pany.383 In the other state case, the city as plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that the rate order was valid.3"'
Given the Court's holding in NOPSI, it is unlikely that the Court would
extend Younger abstention to suits to recover for governmental invasions of
intellectual property rights. The lesson of NOPSI is that Younger is not a
general principle that applies across a range of state proceedings. Instead,
Younger is a narrow rule of deference: "[T]he type of proceeding to which
Younger applies"3"5 includes "state criminal prosecutions,.., civil enforce-
ment proceedings,... and.., civil proceedings involving certain orders that
are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform theirjudicial
functions." '386 In refusing to extend Younger to require deference to the
declaratory judgment and petition to review, the Court in NOPSlemphasized
that "[s]uch a broad abstention requirement would make a mockery of the rule
that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide
a case in deference to the States."38 7 The same answer could appropriately be
given to a suggestion that Younger abstention be ordered in deference to state
condemnation proceedings.3 8 In short, we believe the state and federal cases
may go forward at the same time.
381. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
382. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366 (1989)
(stating that no deference is required when state suits are for review of rate order and for declar-
atory judgment that rate order is valid).
383. Id. at 355.
384. Id. at 356.
385. Id. at 367.
386. Id. at368.
387. Id. Note, however, that the Court here omitted any mention of the extension of
Younger to administrative proceedings, a development that seems somewhat at odds with the
"exceptional circumstances" requirement. See generally, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
388. Another, less well-defined, abstention doctrine sometimes requires federal abstention
when there are parallel federal and state proceedings, if required by "considerations of wise
judicial administration." See Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). The application of this principle depends on the circumstances of particular
cases. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1316-23. It may well require federal
abstention in some pieces of intellectual property litigation and not in others.
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Conclusion
Do not allow the complexity of this body of law to obscure the central
point: One way or another, most victims of governmental invasions of their
intellectual property rights should be able to obtain relief, although the plain-
tiff may be obliged to make his way through a maze of remedial roadblocks
until he has found a theory that works for the circumstances of his particular
case. Among other things, plaintiffs must consider whether the suit is prop-
erly brought against an officer or a government; they should understand the
advantages of litigating in federal court and the difficulty of getting there; and
they should keep in mind the central premise of Seminole Tribe, which is that
state immunity from suit in federal court pre-dates the Eleventh Amendment
and may be abrogated only by Congress's exercise of powers granted in later
times.
The sometimes illogical doctrine results from the nature of the problems
the Supreme Court has had to face. Governmental and official immunity
reflect a set of values that is irreconcilable with governmental and official
accountability for their misuse of intellectual property belonging to others.
The Court could have resolved the tension through a flat rule denying recov-
ery, an approach it has never taken. Alternatively, it could have done away
with immunity, the direction it seemed to have taken in the pre-Seminole Tribe
cases. Instead, it has chosen to try to respect both sides of the issue, produc-
ing a doctrine that fails the test of coherence but may nonetheless afford a
remedy for most violations of intellectual property rights.
NOTES

